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This paper presents a political economy theory of the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle.
The theory predicts that, in both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are set so that the marginal cost
of public funds obeys a submartingale. In the short run, fiscal policy can be pro-cyclical with government
debt spiking up upon entering a boom. However, in the long run, fiscal policy is counter-cyclical with
debt increasing in recessions and decreasing in booms. Government spending increases in booms and
decreases during recessions, while tax rates decrease during booms and increase in recessions. Data
on tax rates from the G7 countries supports the submartingale prediction, and the correlations between
fiscal policy variables and national income implied by the theory are consistent with much of the existing















Real business cycle theory develops the idea that business cycles can be generated by random
ﬂuctuations in productivity. At the core of this research program, the fundamental issues are how
individuals react to productivity shocks and how these reactions aﬀect the macro economy. While
the issue of reaction to shocks is typically studied at the individual level, it can also be raised at
the societal level. How do individuals, through their political institutions, collectively decide to
adjust ﬁscal policies in response to changes in productivity? Moreover, what is the role of changes
in ﬁscal policy in amplifying or dampening shocks? Though understanding individual responses to
shocks can be addressed with the tools of basic microeconomics, understanding societal responses
requires a study of how collective choices are made in complex dynamic environments.
In the last two decades, political economy has made important progress, both theoretically
and empirically, in understanding how governments function and the type of distortions that the
political process generates in an economy. This ﬁrst generation of research, however, has largely
focused on static or two period models that are not well suited to answer the questions raised by
real business cycle theory. When longer time horizons are considered, other important elements of
the environment (such as shocks, rational forward looking agents, etc) are muted. Thus, the basic
question as to how governments react to business cycles is not well understood. Because of this,
empirical analysis on the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy remains largely guided by normative
models of policy making.
With the aim of ﬁlling this void, this paper presents a positive theory of the behavior of ﬁscal
policy over the business cycle. The theory integrates a dynamic political economy model of policy-
making of the form used in Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008) with a neoclassical real business
cycle framework with serially correlated productivity shocks. The theory delivers a number of
interesting predictions concerning the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy variables. Moreover, these
predictions appear consistent with much of the evidence from the U.S. and other countries.
The economic model underlying the theory is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
in which a single good is produced using labor. This good can be consumed or used to produce
a public good. Labor productivity follows a two state, serially-correlated Markov process. When
productivity is high, the economy is in a “boom” and, when it is low, a “recession”. The political
economy component of the model assumes that policy choices in each period are made by a
1legislature comprised of representatives elected by single-member, geographically-deﬁned districts.
The legislature can raise revenues in two ways: via a proportional tax on labor income and by
issuing one period risk-free bonds. The legislature can also purchase bonds and use the interest
earnings to help ﬁnance future public spending if it so chooses. Public revenues are used to
ﬁnance the provision of the public good and to provide targeted district-speciﬁc transfers, which
are interpreted as pork-barrel spending. The legislature makes policy decisions by majority (or
super-majority) rule and legislative policy-making is modelled as non-cooperative bargaining. The
level of public debt and the persistent level of productivity are the state variables, creating a
dynamic linkage across policy-making periods.
The most striking prediction of the theory concerns the dynamic evolution of the so-called
marginal cost of public funds ( M C P F ) .T h eM C P F ,ab a s i cc o n c e p ti np u b l i cﬁnance, is the social
marginal cost of raising an additional unit of tax revenue. It takes into account the distortionary
costs of taxation for the economy. In our model, it depends upon the tax rate and the elasticity
of labor supply. Our theory implies that, at each point in time and over all phases of the cycle,
the equilibrium choice of ﬁscal policies is such that the MCPF obeys a submartingale.1 This
means the expected MCPF next period is always at least as large as the current MCPF and is
sometimes strictly larger. This prediction contrasts with that emerging from a planning model
which implies that the MCPF obeys a martingale. Political distortions therefore create a wedge
between the current MCPF and the future MCPF. Moreover, this wedge is likely to be greater
the lower is the current MCPF, the lower is the level of government debt and the higher is the
productivity of the economy.
The theory also implies that ﬁscal policy will converge to a stochastic steady state in which
policy varies predictably over the business cycle. Upon entering a boom, public spending will
increase, tax rates will fall, but the primary surplus will increase. Over the course of the boom,
public spending will continue to increase until it reaches a ceiling level, and tax rates and the
primary surplus will decrease until they reach ﬂoor levels. When the economy enters a recession,
public spending will decrease, tax rates will increase, but the primary surplus will fall. As the
recession progresses, public spending will continue to decrease, tax rates will continue to increase,
and the primary surplus will increase. The overall ﬁscal stance as measured by the long run pattern
1 In our model the assumptions of the standard submartingale convergence theorem are not satisﬁed, so the
MCPF does not converge to a constant or to inﬁnity as t →∞ . Indeed, we show that in the long run the MCPF
will have a non degenerate stationary distribution.
2of debt is counter-cyclical: government debt decreases in booms and increases in recessions.2
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the long run cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy is that
debt falls when the economy enters a boom. Intuitively, one might have guessed just the opposite.
After all, a boom increases both current and expected future productivity, which reduces the
expected marginal cost of borrowing. This reduction in cost might be expected to lead legislators
to increase debt and use the proceeds to provide pork to their districts. This intuition is correct,
but ignores the fact that any increase in debt will have permanent eﬀects. Thus, such a pro-
cyclical, debt-ﬁnanced pork-fest can occur only in the short run, the ﬁrst time the economy moves
from recession to boom. After it occurs, the level of debt is too high in recessions for it to ever
occur again.
The submartingale prediction of the theory can be tested with time series data on tax rates and
an estimate of the elasticity of labor supply and we ﬁnd supporting evidence for the prediction in
data from the U.S. and the other G7 countries. The cyclical predictions of the theory imply that
debt should be negatively correlated with changes in GDP, while spending should be positively
correlated. The implication concerning debt is consistent with evidence from the U.S. and that
concerning spending is consistent with evidence from the U.S. states and many other countries.
The theory implies that the relationship between the primary surplus and changes in GDP depends
on the phase of the cycle and thus is theoretically ambiguous. This may help explain the varied
correlations that are found in the data. The theory also oﬀers new predictions on the cyclical
behavior of the primary surplus, tax revenues, and pork-barrel spending that await testing.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains how our paper
relates to prior work on the theory of ﬁscal policy. Section 3 outlines the model and Section 4
establishes a benchmark by describing socially optimal ﬁscal policies. Section 5 deﬁnes political
equilibrium, develops a useful characterization of equilibrium, and establishes existence. Section
2 There are a number of deﬁnitions of “counter-cyclical” ﬁscal policy in the literature. Consistent with a
Keynesian perspective, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) and Talvi and Vegh (2005) deﬁne ﬁscal policy to be
counter-cyclical if government spending rises in recessions and tax rates fall. Adopting a neoclassical perspective,
Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2007) deﬁne as counter-cyclical “a policy that follows the tax smoothing principle
of holding constant tax rates and discretionary spending as a fraction of GDP over the cycle”. Our deﬁnition is
that ﬁscal policy is counter-cyclical if debt falls in booms and rises in recessions. Like Alesina, Campante, and
Tabellini, our deﬁnition is motivated by tax smoothing principles. However, it recognizes the fact that in a world
with incomplete markets and unanticipated productivity shocks, these principles do not imply constant tax rates or
government spending over the cycle. While reﬂecting a neoclassical perspective, our deﬁnition does not discriminate
between a neoclassical and Keynesian view of optimal ﬁscal policy over the cycle: in both cases, government debt
will rise in recessions and fall in booms. As suggested by Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004), the way to
discriminate between these views is to look at the behavior of tax rates and public spending. We will discuss this
point in greater detail in Section 6.
36 derives the submartingale result on the marginal cost of public funds and Section 7 explores the
cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy. Section 8 evaluates the empirical implications of the theory and
Section 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
The bulk of theoretical work on the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy has been normative. The the-
oretical framework that has guided empirical work is the tax smoothing theory of ﬁscal policy with
perfect foresight (Barro (1979)). This theory implies that the government should perfectly smooth
both tax rates and government spending by borrowing in recessions and repaying in booms (see,
for example, Talvi and Vegh (2005)). The empirical literature on cyclicality sees the evidence from
developed countries as broadly in line with these predictions, while that from developing countries
is not. In particular, government spending is strongly pro-cyclical in developing countries.3 This
has led the literature to regard the perfect foresight tax smoothing model as an adequate positive
model for developed countries but not for developing countries.
A variety of theories have been advanced to explain the stronger pro-cyclical behavior of gov-
ernment spending in developing countries. In an early attempt to explain the phenomenon, Gavin
and Perotti (1997) note that pro-cyclical policies may be induced by tighter debt constraints in
recessions. Borrowing limits in recessions would force contractionary policies; as the limits are
relaxed in booms, we would observe expansionary policies. Other authors point to the dysfunc-
tional political systems that pervade developing countries. In a dynamic common pool framework
in which multiple groups compete for a share of the national pie, Lane and Tornell (1998) and
Tornell and Lane (1999) suggest that group competition can increase following a positive income
shock which may lead spending to increase more than proportionally to the increase in income
(the so-called voracity eﬀect). In the context of a perfect foresight tax smoothing model, Talvi and
Vegh (2005) show that if spending pressures increase with the size of the primary surplus, then
optimal ﬁscal policy will imply a pro-cyclical pattern of spending. In a political agency framework,
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2007) show that when faced with corrupt governments whose
debt and consumption choices are hard to observe, citizens may rationally demand higher public
spending in a boom.
3 The empirical literature is reviewed in more detail in Section 8 below.
4We take issue with the literature’s view that the perfect foresight tax smoothing model is
adequate to explain the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy in developed economies. First, the
empirical evidence shows that government spending tends to be pro-cyclical even in developed
economies. Second, under the more palatable assumption that cyclical variations are not perfectly
foreseen, the tax smoothing approach has trouble explaining cyclical ﬁscal policy in the long
run. Speciﬁcally, in environments with incomplete markets, the approach often implies that the
government should self-insure, eventually accumulating suﬃcient assets to ﬁnance government
spending out of the interest earnings from these assets (Aiyagari et al (2002)).4 Thus, in the
long run, this model predicts no cyclical pattern in government spending or the primary surplus.
Third, while political systems are admittedly less dysfunctional in developed countries, policies
are determined by the voting decisions of elected representatives and these representatives are
interested in redistributing to their constituents. These political forces will lead policy to depart
from the normative ideal and it is important to understand how.
We see our theory as complementary to the political economy theories of Lane and Tornell
and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini. They are interested in modelling diﬀe r e n t ,a n dm u c hm o r e
dysfunctional, political systems than us. As notedi nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o n ,i nt h es h o r tr u nt h e r em a y
be episodes of procyclical ﬁscal policy that may resemble the voracity eﬀect identiﬁed by Lane and
Tornell. However, our analysis diﬀers from their work in that our economy is subject to recurrent
cyclical shocks rather than a one time permanent shock. This accounts for our conclusions that
the voracity eﬀect can not survive in the long run.
More generally, the theory presented here is part of a second generation of research in po-
litical economy attempting to develop models in more general dynamic environments of interest
to macroeconomists. Examples of this type of work include Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2006), Azzimonti (2007), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Hassler et al (2003), Hassler et al (2005),
Krussel and Rios-Rull (1999), Song, Zilibotti and Storesletten (2007) and Yared (2007). The par-
ticular model presented here builds on the model developed in Battaglini and Coate (2008). It
diﬀers in assuming, ﬁrst, that labor productivity is stochastic rather than constant, and, second,
that citizens’ valuation of the public good is constant rather than subject to i.i.d. shocks. Thus,
4 Diﬀerent conclusions arise when there are complete markets and the government can issue state-contingent
debt. We focus on the incomplete markets assumption here because we feel that it is the most appropriate for
a positive analysis. We refer the reader to Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) for a comprehensive analysis of
optimal ﬁscal policy in a real business cycle model with complete markets and to Marcet and Scott (2007) for an
interesting eﬀort to empirically test between the complete and incomplete market assumptions.
5revenue shocks replace public spending shocks as the driver of ﬁscal policy. More importantly,
the revenue shocks are persistent because labor productivity follows a serially correlated Markov
Process. This makes the problem considerably more challenging from a technical point of view
and it has important implications for the cyclicality of policies that we would not be able to
identify in a model with i.i.d. shocks.
Finally, we note that our theory is related to, but distinct from, the literature on the political
business cycle.5 This literature focuses on cyclical eﬀects of expansionary ﬁscal policies gener-
ated by the attempts of incumbent politicians to win elections. These eﬀects arise when voters
are myopic, or when there is asymmetric information about politicians’ abilities and incumbents
use spending as a signalling device. We assume rational forward-looking voters and complete
information, so the phenomena underlying political business cycles are not present in our model.
Our goal is to study how politicians react to shocks to the real economy rather than to present a
theory of how the political system generates cycles around elections.
3T h e m o d e l
3.1 The economic environment
A continuum of inﬁnitely-lived citizens live in n identical districts indexed by i =1 ,...,n.T h e
size of the population in each district is normalized to be one. There is a single (nonstorable)
consumption good, denoted by z, that is produced using a single factor, labor, denoted by l,w i t h
the linear technology z = wl. There is also a public good, denoted by g, that can be produced
from the consumption good according to the linear technology g = z/p.
Citizens consume the consumption good, beneﬁt from the public good, and supply labor. Each
citizen’s per period utility function is




where α ∈ (0,1) and ε>0. The parameter A measures the value of the public good to the citizens.
Citizens discount future per period utilities at rate δ.
The productivity of labor w varies across periods in a random way, reﬂecting the business
cycle. Speciﬁcally, the economy can either be in a boom or a recession. Labor productivity is wH
5 See Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for excellent reviews of the political business cycle
literature.
6in a boom and wL in a recession, where wL <w H. The state of the economy follows a ﬁrst order









Thus, conditional on the economy being in a recession, the probability of remaining in a recession
is αLL and the probability of transitioning to a boom is αLH. Similarly, conditional on being in
a boom, the probability of remaining in a boom is αHH and the probability of transitioning to a
recession is αHL. Though in many environments it is natural to assume that states are persistent,
this assumption is not necessary for our results. However, we do require that αHH exceeds αLH,
so that the economy is more likely to be in a boom if it was in a boom the previous period.6
There is a competitive labor market and competitive production of the public good. Thus, the
wage rate is equal to wH in a boom and wL in a recession and the price of the public good is p.
There is also a market in risk-free one period bonds. The assumption of a constant marginal utility
of consumption implies that the equilibrium interest rate on these bonds must be ρ =1 /δ −1. At
this interest rate, citizens will be indiﬀerent as to their allocation of consumption across time.
3.2 Government policies
The public good is provided by the government. The government can raise revenue by levying
a proportional tax on labor income. It can also borrow and lend by selling and buying bonds.
Revenues can not only be used to ﬁnance the provision of the public good but can also be diverted
to ﬁnance targeted district-speciﬁc transfers which are interpreted as (non-distortionary) pork-
barrel spending.
Government policy in any period is described by an n +3 - t u p l e{r,g,x,s1,....,sn},w h e r er
i st h ei n c o m et a xr a t e ,g is the amount of the public good provided, x is the amount of bonds
sold, and si is the proposed transfer to district i’s residents. When x is negative, the government
is buying bonds. In each period, the government must also repay any bonds that it sold in the
6 Our basic model assumes that in the “up-part” of the business cycle there is a single productivity level wH,
and in the “down-part” a single productivity level wL. Thus, within booms and recessions, there is no variation
in productivity. While this is a rather spartan conception of a business cycle, the model can be extended to
incorporate within state productivity shocks by assuming that productivity in state θ is given by wθ + ω where ω
is an i.i.d “shock” with mean zero, range [−ω,ω]. Though the introduction of i.i.d shocks makes the distinction
between booms and recessions less clear-cut, the equilibrium of the extended model has the same structure as the
equilibrium of the simpler model described in the text and produces the same predictions of the key correlation
between macro variables. A more complete analysis of this extension is available from the authors.
7previous period. Thus, if it sold b bonds in the previous period, it must repay (1 + ρ)b in the
current period. The government’s initial debt level in period 1 is given exogenously and is denoted
by b0.
In a period in which government policy is {r,g,x,s1,....,sn} and the state of the economy (i.e.,








It is straightforward to show that l∗
θ(r)=( εwθ(1−r))ε,s ot h a tε is the elasticity of labor supply.
A citizen in district i who simply consumes his net of tax earnings and his transfer will obtain a





Since citizens are indiﬀerent as to their allocation of consumption across time, their lifetime
expected utility will equal the value of their initial bond holdings plus the payoﬀ they would
obtain if they simply consumed their net earnings and transfers in each period.
Government policies must satisfy three feasibility constraints. The ﬁrst is that revenues must
be suﬃcient to cover expenditures. To see what this implies, consider a period in which the initial
level of government debt is b, the policy choice is {r,g,x,s1,....,sn}, and the state of the economy
is θ. Expenditure on public goods and debt repayment is pg +( 1+ρ)b,t a xr e v e n u ei s
Rθ(r)=nrwθl∗
θ(r)=nrwθ(εwθ(1 − r))ε, (4)
and revenue from bond sales is x.L e t t i n gt h en e to ft r a n s f e rs u r p l u s(i.e., the diﬀerence between
revenues and spending on public goods and debt repayment) be denoted by
Bθ(r,g,x;b)=Rθ(r) − pg + x − (1 + ρ)b, (5)
the constraint requires that Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥
X
i si.
The second constraint is that the district-speciﬁc transfers must be non-negative (i.e., si ≥ 0
for all i). This rules out ﬁnancing public spending via district-speciﬁcl u m ps u mt a x e s . W i t h
lump sum taxes, there would be no need to impose the distortionary labor tax and hence no tax
smoothing problem.
The third and ﬁnal constraint is that the amount of government borrowing must be feasible.
In particular, there is an upper limit x on the amount of bonds the government can sell. This
8limit is motivated by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold bonds that they know will not be
repaid. If the government were borrowing an amount x such that the interest payments exceeded
the maximum possible tax revenues in a recession; i.e., ρx > maxr RL(r), then, if the economy
were in recession, it would be unable to repay the debt even if it provided no public goods or
transfers. Thus, the maximum level of debt is x =m a x r RL(r)/ρ.
We avoid assuming that there is any “ad hoc” limit on the amount of bonds that the government
can purchase (see Aiyagari et al (2002)). In particular, the government is allowed to hold suﬃcient
b o n d st op e r m i ti tt oa l w a y sﬁnance the Samuelson level of the public good from the interest
earnings. This level of bonds is given by x = −pgS/ρ, where gS is the level of the public good
that satisﬁes the Samuelson Rule.7 Since the government will never want to hold more bonds
than this, there is no loss of generality in constraining the choice of debt to the interval [x,x]a n d
we will do this below.8 We also assume that the initial level of government debt, b0, belongs to
the interval (x,x).
3.3 The political process
Government policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from each of
the n districts. One citizen from each district is selected to be that district’s representative. Since
all citizens have the same policy preferences, the identity of the representative is immaterial and
hence the selection process can be ignored.9 The legislature meets at the beginning of each
period. These meetings take only an insigniﬁcant amount of time, and representatives undertake
private sector work in the rest of the period just like everybody else. The aﬃrmative votes of
q<nrepresentatives are required to enact any legislation.
To describe how legislative decision-making works, suppose the legislature is meeting at the
beginning of a period in which the current level of public debt is b and the state of the economy is
θ. One of the legislators is randomly selected to make the ﬁrst proposal, with each representative
having an equal chance of being recognized. A proposal is a policy {r,g,x,s1,....,sn} that satisﬁes
7 The Samuelson Rule is that the sum of marginal beneﬁts equal the marginal cost, which means that gS satisﬁes
the ﬁrst order condition that nαAgα−1 = p.
8 By assuming that the government can choose to borrow any amount in the interval [x,x], we are implicitly
assuming that labor productivity is suﬃciently high that the amount spent on public goods is never higher than
national income. A suﬃcient condition for this is that nwL(εwL( ε
1+ε))ε >p g S (see Battaglini and Coate (2008)
for details).
9 While citizens may diﬀer in their bond holdings, this has no impact on their policy preferences.
9the feasibility constraints. If the ﬁrst proposal is accepted by q legislators, then it is implemented
and the legislature adjourns until the beginning of the next period. At that time, the legislature
meets again with the diﬀerence being that the initial level of public debt is x and that the state of
the economy may have changed. If, on the other hand, the ﬁrst proposal is not accepted, another
legislator is chosen to make a proposal. There are T ≥ 2 such proposal rounds, each of which takes
a negligible amount of time. If the process continues until proposal round T,a n dt h ep r o p o s a l
made at that stage is rejected, then a legislator is appointed to choose a default policy. The only
restrictions on the choice of a default policy are that it be feasible and that it involve a uniform
district-speciﬁc transfer (i.e., si = sj for all i, j).
4 The social planner’s solution
To create a normative benchmark with which to compare the political equilibrium, we begin by
describing what ﬁscal policy would look like if policies were chosen by a social planner who wished
to maximize aggregate utility. The planner’s problem can be formulated recursively. In a period
in which the current level of public debt is b and the state of the economy is θ, the problem is to








s.t. si ≥ 0 for all i,
X
i si ≤ Bθ(r,g,x;b), & x ∈ [x,x],
(6)
where v◦
θ(x) denotes the representative citizen’s value function in state θ (net of bond holdings).
Surplus revenues will optimally be rebated back to citizens and hence
X
i si = Bθ(r,g,x;b).






s.t. Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
(7)
The problem in this form is fairly standard. The citizen’s value functions v◦
L and v◦
H solve the
pair of functional equations
v◦














θ ∈ {L,H} (8)
10and the planner’s policies in state θ, {r◦
θ(b), g◦
θ(b), x◦
θ(b)}, are the optimal policy functions for this
program.
In any given state (b,θ) the planner’s optimal policies {r◦
θ(b), g◦
θ(b), x◦
θ(b)} are implicitly deﬁned
by three conditions. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h es o c i a lm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt of the public good is equal to the
social marginal cost of ﬁnancing it; that is,
nαAgα−1 = p(
1 − r
1 − r(1 + ε)
). (9)
To interpret this, note that (1 − r)/(1 − r(1 + ε)) measures the marginal cost of public funds
(MCPF) - the social cost of raising an additional unit of revenue via a tax increase. The term on
the right hand side therefore represents the cost of ﬁnancing an additional unit of the public good.
The condition is just the Samuelson Rule modiﬁed to take account of the fact that taxation is
distortionary and it determines the optimal public good level for any given tax rate. The second
condition is that the marginal cost of public funds today equals the expected marginal cost of
debt tomorrow; that is,10
1 − r




This ensures that, on the margin, the cost of ﬁnancing public goods via taxation equals that of
ﬁnancing them by issuing debt. The ﬁnal condition is that the net of transfer surplus be zero;
that is,
Bθ(r,g,x;b)=0 . (11)
This implies that the planner raises no more revenues than are necessary to ﬁnance public good
spending.
Using these conditions, it is possible to show that for each state θ the optimal tax rate and debt
level are increasing in b and the optimal public good level is decreasing in b.U s i n gt h eEnvelope
Theorem, it is also straightforward to show that the marginal cost of debt tomorrow in state θ is




























10 Note that in deriving (10) we are ignoring the upperbound x ≤ x. We show in the Appendix (Section 10.6)
that this is without loss of generality.
11This equation tells us that the optimal debt level equalizes the current MCPF with the corre-
sponding expected MCPF and implies that the MCPF obeys a martingale.11 The condition
illustrates the planner’s desire to smooth taxation between periods. Since the MCPF is a convex
function of the tax rate r, the martingale property implies that the current tax rate exceeds the





θ(b)). Thus, the tax rate behaves as a
supermartingale.12
The Euler equation (13) is the key to understanding the dynamic evolution of the system. It
implies that the planner raises debt in a recession and lowers it in a boom. He raises debt in a
recession because he anticipates that the economic environment can only improve in the future. If
it does improve, the MCPF will be lower since tax rates are lower in booms than in recessions.13
Thus, debt must increase to maintain equation (13). Likewise, when the economy is in a boom,
the planner anticipates that the economic environment can only get worse in the future and thus
increases debt. The upshot is that debt behaves counter-cyclically. On the other hand, public
good spending behaves pro-cyclically with spending increasing in booms and falling in recessions.
What happens in the long run? Consider what would happen if the economy were in a boom
for a very long period of time. Then, tax rates would fall, public good provision would increase,
and debt levels would fall. Eventually, the debt level would reach the lower bound x.A t t h i s
point, the government would have accumulated suﬃcient assets to ﬁnance a ﬁrst best level of
the public good without taxation. From this point on, whatever the state of the economy, the
government could set the tax rate equal to zero, the public good to the Samuelson level, and
balance its budget. The planner would have no incentive to either accumulate further assets or to
reduce assets because tax rates and public good levels would be totally smooth. A steady state
would be reached. In the convergence to the steady state, the MCPF continues to be a martingale,
but it becomes degenerate since both the current and expected MCPF converge to 1. Moreover,
11 A formal derivation of (13) is available in the Appendix (Section 10.6). Bohn (1990) establishes this result
for a stochastic version of the tax smoothing model studied by Barro (1979). Aiyagari et al (2002) show a similar
result for the planner’s solution in a model very similar to ours. To ease the comparison, however, note that the
negative of their Lagrangian multiplier ψt corresponds to our MCPF minus one. It should also be noted that in
their model the planner’s MCPF follows a supermartingale because the upper bound on debt will bind with positive
probability. This however depends on the fact that gt is an exogenous process. As we show in the Appendix, this
can not happen in our framework because gt is endogenous.
12 If the MCPF is linear in the tax rate, as assumed in Bohn (1990), the tax rate behaves as a martingale.
13 While tax rates being lower in booms than in recessions (i.e., r◦
H(b) <r ◦
L(b)) seems natural, it may not be
immediate how to prove it. Since the planner’s solution is a special case of the political equilibrium when q = n,
the result will follow from Lemma 2 in Section 7.
12the tax rate converges to zero.
We conclude therefore that if the economy were in a boom for a suﬃciently long period of
time, the debt level would fall to x and a steady state would be reached. Now observe that with
probability one there must eventually arise a boom period suﬃciently long to allow the planner
to reach the debt level x.T h u s ,w eh a v et h a t : 14
Proposition 1. The social planner’s solution converges to a steady state in which the debt level
is x, the tax rate is 0, and the public good level is gS.
The key point to note is that, while in the short run debt displays the counter-cyclical pattern
usually associated with the tax smoothing approach, this disappears in the long run. Moreover,
all other ﬁscal policy variables are also constant. Proposition 1 thus underscores the point made
in Section 2: when cyclical variations are not perfectly anticipated, the tax smoothing approach
has diﬃculty explaining cyclical ﬁscal policy in the long run.
5 Political equilibrium
5.1 Deﬁnition
To characterize behavior when policies are chosen by a legislature, we look for a symmetric Markov-
perfect equilibrium. In this type of equilibrium any representative selected to propose at round
τ ∈ {1,...,T} of the meeting at some time t makes essentially the same proposal and this depends
only on the current level of public debt (b) and the state of the economy (θ). Similarly, at the
voting stage of a round τ, the probability a legislator votes for a proposal depends only on the
proposal itself and the state (b,θ). As is standard in the theory of legislative voting, we focus
on weakly stage undominated strategies, which implies that legislators vote for a proposal if they
prefer it (weakly) to continuing on to the next proposal round.






τ=1 which specify the proposal made by the proposer in round τ of the meeting in a period in
which the state is (b,θ). Here rτ
θ(b) is the proposed tax rate, gτ
θ(b) is the public good level, xτ
θ(b)i s
the new level of public debt, and sτ
θ(b)i sat r a n s f e ro ﬀered to the districts of q−1 randomly selected




14 A formal proof of the following result is presented in the Appendix (Section 10.13). A similar conclusion holds
when public spending shocks rather than revenue shocks are the driver of ﬁscal policy (see Aiyagari et al (2002)
and Battaglini and Coate (2008)).
13(q−1)sτ




specify the expected future payoﬀ of a legislator at the beginning of proposal round τ in a period
in which the state is (b,θ).
We focus, without loss of generality, on equilibria in which at each round τ,p r o p o s a l sa r ei m -
mediately accepted by at least q legislators, so that on the equilibrium path, no meeting lasts more
than one proposal round. Accordingly, the policies that are actually implemented in equilibrium
are those proposed in the ﬁrst round. In what follows, we will drop the superscript and refer to
the round 1 value function as vθ(b) and the round 1 policy proposal as {rθ(b), gθ(b), xθ(b), sθ(b)}.






τ=1 and the associated value functions {vτ
θ(b)}
T+1
τ=1. On the one hand, given that future
payoﬀs are described by the value functions, the prescribed policy proposals must maximize the
proposer’s payoﬀ subject to the incentive constraint of getting the required number of aﬃrmative
votes and the appropriate feasibility constraints. Formally, given {vτ
θ(b)}
T+1
τ=1, for each proposal




θ(b)} must solve the problem:
max
(r,g,x,s)
uθ(r,g)+Bθ(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δ[αθHvH(x)+αθLvL(x)]
s.t. uθ(r,g)+s + δ[αθHvH(x)+αθLvL(x)] ≥ v
τ+1
θ (b),
Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive constraint and the remainder are feasibility constraints. The
formulation reﬂects the assumption that on the equilibrium path, the proposal made in round 1
is accepted.
On the other hand, the value functions {vτ
θ(b)}
T+1
τ=1 are themselves determined by the equilib-
rium policy proposals. The legislators’ round 1 value functions vL(b)a n dvH(b) are determined




+δ[αθHvH(xθ(b))+αθLvL(xθ(b))] θ ∈ {L,H}.
(14)
To understand this recall that a legislator is chosen to propose in round 1 with probability 1/n.
If chosen to propose, he obtains a payoﬀ in that period of
uθ(rθ(b),g θ(b)) + Bθ(rθ(b),g θ(b),x θ(b);b) − (q − 1)sθ(b).
14If he is not chosen to propose, but is included in the coalition of legislators whose districts re-
c e i v eat r a n s f e r ,h eo b t a i n suθ(rθ(b),g θ(b)) + sθ(b), and, if he is not included, he obtains just
uθ(rθ(b),g θ(b)). The probability that his district will receive a transfer, conditional on not being
chosen to propose, is (q − 1)/(n − 1). Taking expectations, the pork barrel transfers sθ(b) cancel
and the period payoﬀ is as described in (14).
The value functions for rounds 2 and beyond are determined by the associated policy proposals
and the round 1 value functions. For all proposal rounds τ =1 ,..,T −1 the expected future payoﬀ

























This reﬂects the assumption that, in the out-of-equilibrium event that play reaches proposal round
τ + 1, the proposal made at that point will be immediately accepted. Recall that if the round T
proposal is rejected, the assumption is that a legislator is appointed to choose a default tax rate,
public good level, level of debt and a uniform transfer. Thus,
v
T+1






+ δ[αθHvH(x)+αθLvL(x)] : Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x]
¾
.
We say that an equilibrium is well-behaved if the associated round 1 legislators’ value functions
vL and vH are continuous and concave on [x,x]. In what follows, we will ﬁrst characterize a well-
behaved equilibrium and then establish the existence of such an equilibrium. Henceforth, when
we refer to an “equilibrium”, it is to be understood that it is well-behaved.
5.2 Characterization
To understand equilibrium behavior, note that to get support for his proposal the proposer must
obtain the votes of q − 1 other representatives. Accordingly, given that utility is transferable,
he is eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the utility of q legislators. It is therefore as if a
randomly chosen minimum winning coalition (mwc) of q representatives is selected in each period
and this coalition chooses a policy choice to maximize its aggregate utility. Formally, this means




s.t. Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
(15)
15In any given state (b,θ), there are two possibilities: either the mwc will provide pork to the
districts of its members or it will not. Providing pork requires reducing public good spending or
increasing taxation in the present or the future (if ﬁnanced by issuing additional debt). When b
is high and/or the economy is in a recession, the opportunity cost of revenues may be too high to
make this attractive. In this case, the mwc will not provide pork, so Bθ(r,g,x;b) = 0. From (15),
it is clear that the outcome will then be as if the mwc is maximizing the utility of the legislature
as a whole. Indeed, the policy choice will be identical to that a benevolent planner would choose
in the same state and with the same value function.
When b is low and/or the economy is in a boom, the opportunity cost of revenues is lower. Less
tax revenues need to be devoted to debt repayment when b is low and both current and expected
future tax revenues are more plentiful when the economy is in a boom. As a result, the mwc will
allocate revenues to pork and policies will diverge from those that would be chosen by a planner.
Interestingly, it turns out that this diversion of resources toward pork, eﬀectively creates lower
bounds on how low the tax rate and debt level can go, and an upper bound on how high the level
of the public good can be.
To show this, we must ﬁrst characterize the policy choices that the mwc selects when it provides
pork. Consider again problem (15) and suppose that the constraint Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0 is not binding.









The condition says that the beneﬁt of raising taxes in terms of increasing the per-coalition member






This says that the per-capita beneﬁt of increasing the public good must equal the per-coalition
member reduction in transfers that providing the additional unit necessitates. The optimal public
debt level x∗
θ satisﬁes the condition that
x∗
θ =a r gm a x {
x
q
+ δ[αθHvH(x)+αθLvL(x)] : x ∈ [x,x]}. (18)
The optimal level balances the beneﬁt of increasing debt in terms of increasing the per-coalition
member transfer with the expected per-capita cost of an increase in the debt level.
16We can now make precise how the legislature’s ability to divert resources toward pork-barrel
spending eﬀectively creates endogenous bounds on the policy choices.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium value functions vH(b) and vL(b) solve the system of functional
equations













θ ∈ {L,H} (19)
and the equilibrium policies {rθ(b), gθ(b), xθ(b)} are the optimal policy functions for this program.
Thus, the equilibrium policy choices solve a constrained planner’s problem in which the tax
rate can not fall below r∗, the public good level can not exceed g∗, and debt can not fall below the
state contingent threshold x∗
θ.15 However, there is a fundamental diﬀerence with the planner’s
problem (8). The thresholds that constrain the policies are endogenous because they depend on
the economic fundamentals and, in the case of x∗
L and x∗
H, on the equilibrium: so rather than
being constraints that aﬀect the value function, they are determined simultaneously with the value
function.
Given Proposition 2, the nature of the equilibrium policies in a given state θ is clear. For any
equilibrium, deﬁne b∗
θ to be the value of debt such that the triple (r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ)s a t i s ﬁes the constraint
that Bθ(r∗,g∗,x ∗







Then, if the debt level b is such that b ≤ b∗
θ the tax-public good-debt triple is (r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ)a n d
the net of transfer surplus Bθ(r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ;b)i su s e dt oﬁnance transfers. If b>b ∗
θ the budget
constraint binds so that no transfers are given. The tax rate and public debt level strictly exceed
(r∗,x ∗
θ) and the public good level is strictly less than g∗. In this case, therefore, the solution can
be characterized by obtaining the ﬁrst order conditions for problem (19) with only the budget
constraint binding. These are conditions (9), (10), and (11) except with the equilibrium value
functions. It is easy to show that the tax rate and debt level are increasing in b, while the public
good level is decreasing in b.16
15 This result extends Proposition 4 of Battaglini and Coate (2008) by showing that when shocks are persistent
the lower bound on debt in the constrained planning problem will be state-contingent.
16 Details are available from the authors upon request.
175.3 Existence
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we ﬁrst establish that the conditions of Proposition 2
are not only necessary but also suﬃcient.
Proposition 3: Suppose that the value functions vH(b) and vL(b) solve the system of functional
equations (19) where x∗
L and x∗
H satisfy (18). Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the round
1 value functions are vH(b) and vL(b) and the round 1 policy choices {rθ(b), gθ(b), xθ(b)} are the
optimal policy functions for program (19).
Together with Proposition 2, this result might be seen as rationalizing the practice of cap-
turing political economy considerations in complex macroeconomic models by adding exogenous
constraints on the planner’s set of policy instruments (see, for example, Ayagari et al. (2002)).
Propositions 2 and 3, however, qualify this practice by making clear that not only must the con-
straints be endogenous, but also they should apply to all policy variables (debt, taxes, and public
good provision) and depend on the state of the economy.
Using Proposition 3 we can now establish the existence of an equilibrium by showing that there
must exist a pair of value functions vH(b)a n dvL(b)a n dap a i ro fd e b tt h r e s h o l d sx∗
L and x∗
H such
that: (i) vH(b)a n dvL(b) solve (19) given x∗
L and x∗
H,a n d ,( i i )x∗
L and x∗
H solve (18) given vH(b)
and vL(b). In this way, we obtain:
Proposition 4. There exists an equilibrium.
6 Tax smoothing in political equilibrium
As discussed in Section 4, the social planner smooths taxation over time by equalizing the current
MCPF with the expected MCPF next period. This implies that the MCPF behaves as a martingale
and the tax rate as a supermartingale. In this section, we explain how political decision making
distorts tax smoothing.
Note ﬁrst that in political equilibrium, whether the mwc is providing pork or not, the debt







17 Again, in deriving (21) we are ignoring the upperbound x ≤ x. In the Appendix (Section 10.6) we prove that
this is without loss of generality.
18If, for example, the MCPF exceeded the expected marginal cost of debt, the mwc could shift the
ﬁnancing of its spending program from taxation to debt and make each coalition member better
oﬀ.
To develop the implications of equation (21), the next step is to develop an expression for the
marginal cost of debt in each state.
Lemma 1. For each state of the economy θ ∈ {L,H}, the equilibrium value function vθ(·) is















n )i f b<b ∗
θ
. (22)
To understand this, recall that when the initial debt level b exceeds b∗
θ, there is no pork, so to
pay back an additional unit of debt requires an increase in taxes. This means that the cost of
an additional unit of debt is equal to the repayment amount 1 + ρ multiplied by the per capita
MCPF. By contrast, when b is less than b∗
θ, pork will be reduced to pay back additional debt
since that is the marginal use of resources. The cost of an additional unit of debt is thus equal to
1+ρ multiplied by the expected per capita reduction in pork which is 1/n. Notice that the value
function is not diﬀerentiable at b = b∗
θ. The left hand derivative at b = b∗
θ is equal to (1+ρ)/n and
the right hand derivative is equal to (1 + ρ)/q (since the tax rate rθ(x)e q u a l sr∗ at b = b∗
θ).18
This discontinuity reﬂects the fact that increasing taxes is more costly than reducing pork because
the marginal cost of taxation exceeds 1.
Using Lemma 1, we can rewrite equation (21) as follows:
1 − rθ(b)
1 − rθ(b)(1+ε)







1 − rθ0(xθ(b))(1 + ε)
. (23)
Now recall from the characterization that when xθ(b)i sl e s st h a no re q u a lt ob∗
θ0,t h et a xr a t e






1 − rθ0(xθ(b))(1 + ε)
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19 Equation (24) is obtained by adding and subtracting Pr
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hand side of (23).
19The current MCPF is therefore less than or equal to the expected future MCPF. This yields:





1 − rH(xθ(b))(1 + ε)
]+αθL[
1 − rL(xθ(b))
1 − rL(xθ(b))(1 + ε)
], (25)
with the inequality strict when b is suﬃciently low.
Why when the inequality in equation (25) is strict does the mwc not ﬁnd it optimal to raise
taxes and reduce debt in order to equalize the current MCPF with the expected future MCPF?
The answer is that if next period’s mwc is providing pork, the correspondent increase in revenues
will simply be diverted toward pork. This creates a wedge between the current MCPF and the
expected future MCPF. The generality of this intuition indeed suggests that a similar result would
be true in any dynamic political economy model of debt.
What can we say about the evolution of the tax rate? As noted in the discussion of the planner’s
solution, when the MCPF obeys a martingale, the tax rate behaves as a supermartingale. In states
(b,θ) such that xθ(b)i sl e s st h a no re q u a lt ob∗
θ0 for some θ0 however, two forces push the diﬀerence
between the current and expected tax rate in opposite directions: the convexity of the MCPF
pushes the diﬀerence up, and the submartingale property of the MCPF pushes it down. As we
prove in the following proposition, there are states in which the ﬁrst force dominates, implying
that the current tax rate is strictly less than the expected future tax rate. This yields:
Proposition 6. The tax rate is not a martingale of any type; that is, there exist states such that
next period’s expected tax rate exceeds the current tax rate and states such that the opposite is
true.
By the same logic, it is easy to prove that debt and the public good level will not be martingales
of any type as well. In Section 7.2 we will show that the distribution of the MCPF, the tax rate,
the public good level and debt all converge to a unique stationary distribution.
7 Cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policies
From the characterization in Section 5.2, we understand the nature of the equilibrium policies in
a given state of the economy θ. This section ﬁrst explains how policies compare across booms
and recessions. It then use this understanding to explore the behavior of ﬁscal policies over the
business cycle.
207.1 Comparing policies in booms and recessions
To compare policies across states, the key step is to understand how the political constraints
change over the cycle, i.e. the relationship between x∗
H and x∗
L. The determination of the debt
levels x∗
H and x∗
L can be illustrated in a simple diagram. However, some preliminary work is
necessary to pave the way for the graphical analysis. First note from (18) that if the expected
value function αθHvH +αθLvL is diﬀerentiable at x∗










This tells us that the beneﬁt of increasing debt in terms of increasing the per-coalition member
transfer must equal the expected per-capita marginal cost of an increase in the debt level.20
The expected marginal cost of debt depends on the marginal cost of debt in both states and
thus the next step is to understand how the marginal cost diﬀe r sa c r o s ss t a t e s .L e m m a1i m p l i e s
that the marginal cost of debt in a recession lies above that in a boom if two conditions are
satisﬁed. First, the threshold debt level in a boom exceeds that in a recession (i.e., b∗
H >b ∗
L),
and, second, the tax rate in a recession is larger than that in a boom when pork is not provided
(i.e., rH(b) <r L(b) for all b ≥ b∗
H). Intuitively, we would expect that both these conditions would
be satisﬁed. After all, in a recession, not only is the tax base smaller but also low wages are
expected to persist over time, so the expected cost of borrowing will be higher. The following
result conﬁrms these intuitions.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium: (i) b∗
H >b ∗
L, and, (ii) rH(b) <r L(b) for all b ≥ b∗
H.
We can now illustrate the determination of x∗
θ in an equilibrium. The horizontal axis of
Figure 1 measures the level of debt and the vertical the marginal cost of debt. On the Figure,
we have graphed the discounted marginal cost of debt in the two states −δv0
L(b)a n d−δv0
H(b).
Following Lemma 2, the marginal cost of debt in a recession lies above that in a boom for b ≥ b∗
L.
We have also combined these two curves to form the expected discounted marginal cost of debt
−δ[αθHv0
H +αθLv0
L], which lies between the other two curves. The debt level x∗
θ occurs where the
expected marginal cost of debt intersects the horizontal line emanating from 1/q.
It is clear from the Figure that x∗
θ must be greater than b∗
L and can be no larger than b∗
H.
20 If the expected value function is not diﬀerentiable at x∗
θ, then there must exist subgradients ξH and ξL of the
functions vH and vL at x∗
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Figure 1: The determination of x∗
θ: the interior solution.
However, it is possible that x∗
θ equals b∗
H. This case, which is illustrated in Figure 2, arises
when the expected marginal cost curve lies everywhere below 1/q on the interval (b∗
L,b ∗
H). It will
necessarily arise when αθH is suﬃciently close to 1 in which case legislators anticipate being in a
boom in the next period and have no incentive to restrain their pork consumption in anticipation
of a recession. In this case, the expected marginal cost function αθHvH + αθLvL will not be
diﬀerentiable at x∗
θ.
Since αHH is strictly larger than αLH, the expected marginal cost of debt in a boom lies to
the right of that in a recession. Accordingly, if x∗
L <b ∗
H as in Figure 1, the amount that the mwc
borrows when providing pork in a boom (x∗
H) will be bigger than the amount they borrow in a
recession (x∗
L). On the other hand, if x∗
L = b∗
H,t h e nx∗
H = x∗
L = b∗
H.T h i sc a s ea r i s e so n l yw h e n
αLH is suﬃciently close to αHH to make a recession barely persistent. Under these circumstances,
legislators would not ﬁnd it optimal to borrow less when providing pork during a recession than
during a boom because the recession is suﬃciently likely to revert to a boom. From here on, we
will assume that the transition probabilities are such that x∗
L <x ∗
H which we see as the most
interesting case.21
We can now compare ﬁscal policies in booms and recessions. In addition to public spending,
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Figure 2: The determination of x∗
θ:t h ec o r n e rs o l u t i o n .
taxes and debt, we will also be interested in the primary surplus which is the diﬀerence between
tax revenues and public spending other than interest payments. In our model, it is the diﬀerence
between tax revenues and spending on the public good and pork. Using the budget constraint,
we may write the primary surplus when the state of the economy is θ and the current debt level
is b as PS θ(b)=( 1+ρ)b − xθ(b).
The comparison of policies will depend on the initial level of debt b.W h e nb is less than b∗
L
the mwc provides pork in both booms and recessions (since b∗
L <b ∗
H by Lemma 2). In this case,
the tax rate and public good provision are constant across states, respectively at r∗ and g∗, while
debt will be higher in a boom than in a recession (respectively, x∗
H versus x∗
L). Tax revenues will
be higher in a boom and these extra revenues, together with the extra borrowing, will be used
to ﬁnance higher levels of pork-barrel spending. The primary surplus will be lower in a boom
because borrowing is higher.
When b is between b∗
L and b∗
H the mwc provides pork in a boom but not in a recession. In
this case, taxes will be higher in a recession and public good provision will be lower. Over this
interval of initial debt levels, the new level of debt will be constant in a boom, but increasing in a
recession. We show in the Appendix that there will be a threshold initial debt level b b ∈ (b∗
L,b ∗
H)
such that new debt will be higher in a recession if and only if b>b b. Tax revenues will be higher
in a boom when b ≥ b b, while the primary surplus will be higher in a boom if and only if b ≥ b b.
23Finally, when b exceeds b∗
H the mwc does not provide pork in either state. In this range, public
good levels will be lower in a recession (gL(b) <g H(b)), tax rates will be higher (rL(b) >r H(b)),
and public borrowing will be higher (xL(b) >x H(b)). Tax revenues and the primary surplus will
be higher in a boom.
7.2 Policy dynamics
With this understanding of how policies compare across the two states of the economy, we can
now turn to the dynamic evolution of policy. Clearly, the key to understanding the dynamics is to
understand how debt behaves. The cyclical behavior of all the remaining ﬁscal policies will follow
from the behavior of debt given the results we already have.
The fundamental result concerning the dynamic evolution of debt is the following:
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium: (i) xL(b) >bfor all b ∈ [x,x), and, (ii) xH(b) >bfor all
b ∈ (x,x ∗
H) and xH(b) <bfor all b ∈ (x∗
H,x].
Part (i) implies that the debt level always increases in a recession. Intuitively, if we are in
a recession today, the economic environment can only improve in the future. This makes it
worthwhile for the legislature to increase debt. Part (ii) implies that the debt level decreases in a
boom if the initial debt level exceeds x∗
H and increases otherwise. Figure 3 graphs the functions
xL(b)a n dxH(b).
We can now infer the cyclical behavior of debt. Note ﬁrst that, in the short run, it is possible
for debt to behave pro-cyclically - jumping up when the economy enters a boom. To see this,
suppose that the economy’s initial level of debt (b0)i sl e s st h a nx∗
H and the economy starts out
in a recession. Then, once the ﬁrst boom arrives, if the level of accumulated debt remains less
than x∗
H,d e b tw i l li n c r e a s et ox∗
H upon entering the boom. The boom increases both current and
expected future productivity, which reduces the expected marginal cost of debt. Debt-ﬁnanced
pork instantaneously becomes more attractive for the mwc because of the downward shift in
the expected marginal cost of borrowing. Debt jumps to a level at which equality between the
marginal beneﬁt of pork and the expected marginal cost of borrowing is reestablished and, during
this process, a “pork-fest” occurs. This is very similar to the logic underlying Lane and Tornell’s
voracity eﬀect.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium dynamics
enters a boom and increasing when it enters a recession.22 For once such a pro-cyclical debt
expansion has occurred it can never happen again. The damage of the pork-fest to public ﬁnances
is permanent. This is clear from Figure 3. The debt level is bounded below by x∗
H in a boom and,
as demonstrated in Lemma 3, it is increasing in a recession. In the long-run, therefore, once the
ﬁrst boom has occurred and debt has jumped up to x∗
H, ﬁscal policy will behave counter-cyclically:
in a recession, debt will increase and, in a boom, debt will decrease down to x∗
H a n dt h e nr e m a i n
constant. Moreover, we can show that no matter what the economy’s initial debt level, the same
distribution of debt emerges in the long run. To summarize:
Proposition 7. In any equilibrium, the debt distribution strongly converges to a unique, non
degenerate, invariant distribution with support on [x∗
H,x]. The dynamic pattern of debt is counter-
cyclical. When the economy enters a recession, debt will increase and will continue to increase as
long as the recession persists. When the economy enters a boom, debt decreases and, during the
boom, continues to decline until it reaches x∗
H.
22 As noted earlier, the voracity eﬀect papers just consider the implications of a one time positive income shock.
25Why can we not have recurrent episodes of pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy (“pork fests”) in the
long term? As we said, these episodes occur only after the arrival of an unexpected increase in
productivity that increases politicians’ expectation of future revenues and triggers a permanent
increase in debt. In our economy there is no permanent growth, so there is a limit to these positive
productivity “surprises”. Speciﬁcally, such a surprise only occurs the ﬁrst time the economy
moves from a recession to a boom. Once this has happened, the level of debt already incorporates
the eﬀects of potential productivity growth. In an economy with permanent growth, positive
technological surprises may lead to constant (though stochastic) increases in productivity. We
conjecture that in such an economy pro-cyclical “pork fests” will occur even in the long run
whenever the upperbound on productivity is increased.23 The result in Proposition 7 is therefore
best interpreted as applying to a mature economy in which these growth eﬀects are not a dominant
force.
Since the remaining ﬁscal policies are all functions of debt, Proposition 7 implies that the
distribution of these policies will also be invariant in the long term. Combining Proposition 7
with our understanding of equilibrium policies from the previous section, allows us to predict
their long-run cyclical behavior. We deal ﬁrst with taxes and public good spending.
Proposition 8. In any equilibrium, in the long run, when the economy enters a recession, the tax
rate increases and public good provision decreases. Moreover, the tax rate will continue to increase
and public good provision will continue to decrease as long as the recession persists. When the
economy enters a boom, the tax rate decreases and public good provision increases. During the
boom, the tax rate continues to decline and public good provision continues to increase until they
reach, respectively, r∗ and g∗.
The cyclical behavior of the tax rate determines the dynamics of the MCPF. Proposition 8
implies that the MCPF will increase when the economy enters a recession and continue to increase
as long as the recession persists. At any point in time, the MCPF is ﬁnite because the tax rate is
always lower than the revenue maximizing level (which is 1/(1+ε)). In a suﬃciently long recession,
however, the tax rate may become arbitrarily close to 1/(1 + ε), and so the MCPF may become
arbitrarily large.24 When the MCPF is large, however, it must behave as a martingale. For,
23 The behavior of ﬁscal policy in such an economy is a very interesting subject for further research.
24 It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that the fact the MCPF is arbitrarily large when r is close to the peak of
the Laﬀer curve only means that at that point tax revenues can not be further increased by increasing r.M o r e o v e r ,
26by then, b will be bigger than b∗
H. Proposition 8 also implies that the MCPF will decrease when
the economy enters a boom and continue to decline until it reaches its ﬂoor level (which is n/q).
Along this decreasing path, the MCPF will eventually start to behave as a strict submartingale.
After a suﬃciently long recession, however, the MCPF will temporarily continue to behave as a
martingale even when the economy returns to a boom because it will take time for debt to reduce
to a level such that the probability of the event {(b,θ)|xθ(b) <b ∗
H } is positive.
We turn next to the cyclical pattern of pork-barrel spending.
Proposition 9. In any equilibrium, in the long run, pork-barrel spending will not occur during
a recession. Moreover, it will only occur during a boom once the debt accumulated during prior
recessions has been paid oﬀ and debt has reached x∗
H.
The only circumstance in which pork-barrel spending begins immediately when the economy moves
into a boom is when the accumulated debt level is less than b∗
H. In all other cases, debt is paid
down before pork-barrel spending starts up.
When combined with the dynamic pattern of public good spending described in Proposition 8,
an important implication of Proposition 9 is that total public expenditure (which includes pork-
barrel spending and public good provision) is pro-cyclical. The equilibrium changes in public
spending and taxes therefore serve to amplify the business cycle. These predictions are distinctive
and serve to nicely diﬀerentiate the predictions of our neoclassical theory from what would be
expected if government were following a Keynesian counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy. For, in a recession,
a Keynesian government would reduce taxes and increase public spending to bolster aggregate
demand.
Our ﬁnal ﬁscal policy of interest is the primary surplus.
Proposition 10. In any equilibrium, in the long run, when the economy enters a recession, the
primary surplus jumps down and then starts gradually increasing. When the economy enters a
boom, the primary surplus jumps up and then starts gradually declining until it reaches a minimal
level of ρx∗
H.
This long run behavior is illustrated in Figure 4, which is drawn under the assumption that x∗
H is
positive. Notice that because in long run equilibrium debt always exceeds x∗
H, the primary surplus
since it can be shown that supt E(MCPFt) is unbounded, the standard submartingale convergence theorem does
not apply and so the MCPF does not converge to a constant (see for example Shiryayev (1996)); and this does not
imply that the MCPF converges to an arbitrarily large number. Indeed it is clear that the MCPF must recurrently
drop to its ﬂoor level n









Figure 4: The long run behavior of primary surplus.
will be larger in a boom than a recession for any given level of observed debt.25
8 Evaluating the theory
In this section, we develop and evaluate the empirical implications of our theory. Our results
contribute to two diﬀerent strands of empirical research: the literature studying the martingale
properties of tax rates and the literature on the cyclicality of ﬁscal policies. We discuss each in
turn.
8.1 Martingale properties of tax rates
Stimulating a signiﬁcant empirical literature, Barro (1979, 1981) conjectured that the marginal
tax rate on income should follow a martingale in an optimal tax plan.26 T h ed i s c u s s i o no ft h e
planner’ problem in Section 4 has qualiﬁed this observation, showing that it is the MCPF that
should evolve as a martingale in an optimal plan and the tax rate should obey a supermartingale.27
In a political equilibrium, however, Proposition 5 shows that the MCPF follows a submartingale
25 This follows from the results in section 7.1 once it is observed from Figure 3 that e b is smaller than x∗
H.
26 See, for example, Bizer and Durlauf (1990), Bohn (1990), Hess (1993), and Sahasakul (1986).
27 As noted in footnote 11, Aiyagari et al (2002) and Bohn (1990) demonstrate similar results concerning the
MCPF for the planner’s solution of their models. In Bohn’s model the MCPF is linear in the tax rate and hence
the tax rate does behave as a martingale. Aiyagari et al also show under more general assumptions on the utility
function that the MCPF is a “risk adjusted” martingale.
28and Proposition 6 shows that the tax rate does not follow a martingale of any type.
The empirical predictions of the equilibrium concerning the dynamic evolution of the MCPF
can be further reﬁned with the results of Section 7. Proposition 7 tells us that, in the long run,
debt is contained in the interval [x∗
H,x]a n dw ek n o wt h a tx∗
H exceeds b∗
L. Thus, equation (24)
tells us that when the probability of the event {(b,θ)|xθ(b) <b ∗
H } is positive, the MCPF will be
strictly less than the expected MCPF, but when it is zero the MCPF will obey a martingale. Since
xθ(b)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb,w em a yc o n c l u d et h a tt h eM C P Fi sm o r el i k e l yt ob e h a v ea sam a r t i n g a l e
the higher is the debt level. Moreover, since xL(b) exceeds xH(b) in the long run, the MCPF is
more likely to behave as a martingale in recessions. Since the MCPF is increasing in b and higher
in recessions, it follows that the MCPF will behave as a strict submartingale when it is suﬃciently
low.
How can we test these predictions concerning the dynamics of the MCPF? In our model, the
MCPF in any period t just depends on the elasticity of labor supply and the income tax rate in
period t;t h a ti s ,
MCPFt =
1 − rt
1 − rt(1 + ε)
. (27)
Under the assumptions of our model, therefore, the predictions can be tested with time series
data on tax rates and an estimate of the elasticity of labor supply. While we recognize that under
more general assumptions the MCPF will likely depend on other variables, we will explore the
dynamics of the MCPF empirically assuming that (27) holds. Our eﬀorts should therefore be
interpreted as an initial exploration.
To test our predictions on the dynamic evolution of the MCPF using (27), we deﬁne ∆MCPFθ(b)












Figure 5 shows the time series of MCPFt and ∆MCPFt from 1951 to 2003 for the U.S.. The
value of MCPFt is computed from rt using (27) and an estimate of the elasticity of labor supply
ε. We assume that ε equals one and take our data on labor income tax rates from McDaniel
(2007).28 To compute ∆MCPFt,w en e e d e da ne s t i m a t eo ft h ee x p e c t a t i o no fMPCFt+1
28 McDaniel’s work extends the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994) using data up to 2003 and preceeding
1967. Results similar to those reported in Figure 5 and 6 are obtained with alternative assumptions on the elasticity


















Figure 5: Time series of MCPFt and ∆MCPFt from 1951 to 2003 for the USA. The higher solid
line (in blue) represents MCPFt, the lower solid line (in red) represents ∆MCPFt.T h e d o t t e d
lines represent a +1/-1 standard deviation error band on ∆MCPFt.
conditional on the information available at t. To this end, we assumed that MCPFt follows
an AR(1) process and estimated the time series E [MCPFt+1 |MCPFt] by Bayesian methods.29
The error bands in Figure 5 are then constructed by simulating the posterior distribution of
MCPFt − E [MCPFt+1 |MCPFt].
F i g u r e5i l l u s t r a t e st w os t r i k i n gf a c t s .F i r s t ,t h ed i ﬀerence ∆MCPFt is negative for the vast
majority of time periods.30 Second, it approaches zero only in the region in which MCPFt is
high. The pattern therefore seems consistent with the prediction that the MCPF behaves as a
strict submartingale when small enough, and as a martingale for higher values.
Remarkably, the same pattern emerges for the remaining G7 countries. Indeed, the evidence is
even more compelling. Figure 6 shows that for four of our six countries the time series ∆MCPFt
29 For the estimation we adopt a ﬂat prior with a standard correction to avoid overweighting the initial observa-
tions (Dummy Observation Prior). The results, however, do not change if we assume a Natural Conjugate Prior.
Similar results are also found using classical estimation methods.
30 Indeed, we can reject the hypothesis that the long term expected value of ∆MCPFθ(b) is positive at practically
any level of signiﬁcance. The process ∆MCPFt is covariance stationary but autocorrelated. The Central Limit
Theorem applies to its sample mean after correcting the variance of the statistic to account for the autocorrelation
of ∆MCPFt.
30Figure 6: Time series of MCPFt and ∆MCPFt from 1950 to 2003 for the G7 countries excluding
the US.
31is negative for all t. The only country in which ∆MCPFt appears to be positive for a signiﬁcant
fraction of time (1975-1985) is the U.K., but even in this case we can reject the hypothesis that the
long term expected value of ∆MCPFt is positive at practically any level of signiﬁcance. Indeed,
the deviation can probably be explained as an eﬀect of the discovery of the North Sea Oil which,
though discovered in the 60s, started being extracted in the early 70s. Moreover, the Figure also
shows that for all countries except Japan MCPFt tends to be high when ∆MCPFt is closer to
zero.31
8.2 The cyclicality of ﬁscal policy
The empirical literature on the cyclicality of ﬁscal policy focuses on the correlation of debt, govern-
ment spending, and the primary surplus, with changes in GDP. We ﬁrst develop the implications
of our theory for these correlations. We then place these implications in context by comparing
them with those of the perfect foresight tax smoothing model that has guided past empirical
work. Finally, we discuss the consistency of our theory’s implications with the existing evidence
and identify other cyclicality predictions that might be studied in future work.
The empirical implications of the theory Consider ﬁrst the correlation of debt and GDP.
Proposition 7 implies that debt levels go down upon entering a boom and continue to decline over
the course of a boom. By contrast, debt levels are increasing over the course of a recession. Since
GDP levels are increasing over the course of a boom and decreasing over the course of a recession,
debt and GDP are always moving in the opposite direction.32 Thus, the theory predicts that debt
and GDP should be negatively correlated.
Next consider the correlation of spending and GDP. Propositions 8 and 9 imply that public
spending levels go up upon entering a boom and continue to increase over the course of a boom
until they reach a ceiling level. By contrast, spending levels are decreasing over the course of a
recession. Since GDP levels are increasing over the course of a boom and decreasing over the
course of a recession, the theory predicts that spending and GDP should be positively correlated.
Notice, however, that the theory provides no predictions on the correlation between spending as
31 The MCPFt and ∆MCPFt would be positively correlated even for Japan if we started the time series after
1960.
32 While productivity levels are constant, GDP levels are increasing (decreasing) during booms (recessions)
because tax rates are decreasing (increasing) (Proposition 8).
32a proportion of GDP and GDP. This is because when GDP increases both the numerator and the
denominator of the ratio increase and which increases more will depend on how the parameters
of the model are calibrated.
Turning to the correlation of the primary surplus and GDP, Proposition 10 implies that the
primary surplus, after jumping up upon entering a boom, then declines over the course of a boom.
By contrast, the primary surplus is increasing ove rt h ec o u r s eo far e c e s s i o n .S i n c eG D Pl e v e l sa r e
increasing over the course of a boom and decreasin go v e rt h ec o u r s eo far e c e s s i o n ,t h ep r i m a r y
surplus and GDP move in the same direction when the economy transitions to a boom and in the
opposite direction over the course of a boom or a recession. Accordingly, the theory provides no
clear prediction concerning the correlation of primary surplus and GDP.33
While the correlation of tax rates and tax revenues with changes in GDP has not been a focus
of this strand of empirical work, it is worth noting what our theory has to say on this. From
Proposition 8, it is straightforward to see that the tax rate is negatively correlated with GDP.
This immediately implies that tax revenues as a proportion of GDP will be negatively correlated
with GDP. The theory provides no clear prediction concerning the correlation of tax revenues with
GDP. At the onset of a boom, these variables move in the same direction: both GDP and tax
revenues increase. However, during a boom, the decreasing tax rate moves tax revenues and GDP
in opposite directions.
The empirical implications of the perfect foresight tax smoothing model The per-
fect foresight tax smoothing model implies that the government will smooth both tax rates and
government spending by borrowing in recessions and repaying in booms. Thus, debt will be in-
creasing in booms and decreasing in recessions, implying that debt is positively correlated with
changes in GDP. Government spending will be uncorrelated with changes in GDP, but govern-
ment spending as a proportion of GDP will be negatively correlated. The primary surplus will be
positively correlated with changes in GDP, as will primary surplus as a proportion of GDP. Tax
rates and tax revenues as a proportion of GDP will be uncorrelated with changes in GDP, while
tax revenues will be positively correlated.
33 It is tempting to wonder if this ambiguity could be resolved by further theoretical analysis, but we suspect that
this will not be the case. The oﬀsetting forces generating the ambiguity seem perfectly natural and there seems no
good reason why one should outweigh the other. Understanding precisely the circumstances under which one force
dominates the other will require numerical simulation of the model, a task we leave for future work.
33The prediction concerning the correlation of debt with GDP is identical to that of our theory,
while the implications concerning spending diverge. The theories also diverge on the correlation of
tax revenue as a proportion of GDP with changes in GDP. The tax smoothing model yields sharper
implications concerning the correlation of GDP changes with primary surplus, primary surplus as
a proportion of GDP, spending as a proportion of GDP and tax revenues, than our model. These
implications follow from the theoretical prediction of perfect smoothing of taxes and spending
which in turn stems from the assumption that cyclical variations are perfectly anticipated. They
make the perfect foresight tax smoothing model something of a straw man.34
The existing evidence The correlation between debt and income changes has been studied
by Barro (1986) for the U.S. federal government. Using data from the period 1916-1982, he found
a negative correlation between changes in debt and changes in GNP. This evidence is consistent
with both the perfect foresight tax smoothing model and with our theory.35
The correlation between government consumption (which excludes transfers and debt interest
payments) and changes in GDP has been studied extensively for the U.S. both at the federal and
state level, and for diﬀerent groups of countries aggregated according to geographical location and
stage of economic development.36 The basic ﬁndings are that government consumption tends
to be slightly pro-cyclical for developed economies, and much more pro-cyclical for developing
countries.37 A sn o t e di ns e c t i o n2 ,t h e s eﬁndings have been interpreted as suggesting that ﬁscal
policy is consistent with the perfect foresight tax smoothing model in developed countries and
inconsistent in developing countries. Strictly speaking, of course, neither ﬁnding is consistent
with the tax smoothing model. However, both are consistent with our theory. It is also important
34 Relaxing the assumption of perfectly anticipated shocks, yields less stark results in the short run, but, as
Proposition 1 shows, untenable results in the long run.
35 Barro runs regressions of the form (bt − bt−1)/yt = α · Xt + βyvart + εt,where bt is debt, yt is GNP, Xt is a
vector of control variables, yvart is a business cycle indicator, and εt is a shock. The business cycle indicator takes
on negative values during a boom and positive values during a recession. He ﬁnds that the coeﬃcient β is positive,
suggesting that debt behaves counter-cyclically. On the other hand, he also ﬁnds that the coeﬃcient β is greater
than 1 suggesting that debt falls more than proportionally to GNP in a recession. His interpretation is that, in a
recession, not only do tax revenue falls but also tax rates are reduced. The latter implication is not consistent with
our model, which predicts that tax rates will be higher in a recession. It is more consistent with the idea that the
U.S. government is following a Keynesian counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy.
36 Gavin and Perotti (1997) compare a sample of Latin American countries with a sample of industrialized
countries. Sorensen, Wu and Yosha (2001) study the U.S. states. Lane (2003) looks at all the OECD countries.
Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2007), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), and Woo
(2006) look at data sets containing a broad sample of developed and developing countries.
37 See, in particular, Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2007), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Kaminsky, Reinhart
and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), and Woo (2006).
34to note that these ﬁndings suggest that the governments of most countries are not following a
Keynesian counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy.
The correlation between the primary surplus and changes in GDP has also been studied
extensively.38 These studies show that there is a positive correlation between the primary sur-
plus and changes in GDP. However, again there is a diﬀerence between developed and developing
counties. Consistent with the ﬁndings on spending, the cyclical increase in the primary surplus is
much greater for developed countries. In particular, the primary surplus as a proportion of GDP
is strongly positively correlated with changes in GDP in developed countries and only weakly
positively or even negatively correlated in developing countries.39 Again, while the ﬁndings from
the developing countries appear inconsistent with the perfect foresight tax smoothing model, they
are, in principle, consistent with our theory.
Suggestions for further empirical research Future empirical research in this vein might
usefully explore the predictions of the theory developed here more systematically. One implication
of interest that would seem straightforward to test is the negative correlation of tax revenues as a
proportion of GDP with GDP. Of more interest, but much harder to test because of measurement
issues, is the prediction stated in Proposition 9 that pork is pro-cyclical. Another interesting
possibility would be to study the behavior of the primary surplus in more detail. The theory
implies that, in long run equilibrium, for any given debt level that might be observed, the primary
surplus will be higher in a boom than in a recession. This is a testable proposition. Also of interest
is the fact that the primary surplus is decreasing in booms and increasing in recessions. Finally,
it would be useful to numerically simulate the model to generate a deeper understanding of the
relationships implied by the model and the factors that determine the degree of cyclicality of the
ﬁscal variables. It may be that the diﬀerences between developed and developing countries that
are observed in the data can be traced to some underlying diﬀerence in the fundamentals.40
38 Bohn (1998) studies the U.S. federal government, while Sorensen, Wu and Yosha (2001) look at the U.S. states.
Lane (2003) considers the OECD countries and Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2007) look at a large sample of
developed and developing countries.
39 See, in particular, Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2007), Bohn (1998) and Gavin and Perotti (1997).
40 For example, Talvi and Vegh (2005) document that tax base ﬂuctuations are much greater in developing
countries.
359 Conclusion
The literature on real business cycles studies how competitive markets react to random ﬂuctuations
i np r o d u c t i v i t yo ro t h e re c o n o m i cf u n d a m e n t a l s .A tt h ec o r eo ft h i sl i t e r a t u r et h e r ei st h eq u e s t i o n
of how agents individually respond to these shocks by adjusting their consumption and saving
levels. In this paper we have studied the complementary question of how agents, through their
political institutions, collectively react to these same shocks by adjusting ﬁscal policy. Given the
importance of the public sector in contemporary market economies, answering this question is
clearly a necessary condition for a satisfactory positive theory of business cycles.
Our theory assumes that society delegates the choice of ﬁscal policy to a legislature comprised of
representatives elected by single-member, geographically-deﬁned districts. While representatives
are perfect agents of their constituents, the theory incorporates a realistic distributional conﬂict
by assuming that they can target revenues back to their districts via pork-barrel spending. This
distributional conﬂict means that the legislature’s policy choices solve a particular “constrained”
planning problem. The constraints consist of an upper bound on public good provision, a lower
bound on the tax rate, and state-contingent lower bounds on debt.
Our theory yields three central predictions. The ﬁr s ti st h a te q u i l i b r i u mﬁscal policies are
such that the marginal cost of public funds obeys a submartingale. This is a sharp prediction
that is relatively straightforward to test. Given that in the planner’s solution the MCPF obeys
a martingale, it also provides a simple and intuitive way of understanding how political decision-
making distorts ﬁscal policy.
The second prediction is that, in the long run, debt displays a counter-cyclical pattern, in-
creasing in recessions and decreasing in booms. This is contrary to the intuitions emerging from
t h el i t e r a t u r eo nt h ev o r a c i t ye ﬀect which suggest that the distributional conﬂict created by pork-
barrel spending would result in debt increasing in booms. However, this literature considers a
one time only positive shock, whereas in our model, the economy is subject to recurrent cyclical
shocks. While a “voracity eﬀect”-style debt expansion can arise when the economy ﬁrst moves
from recession to boom, after it occurs, the level of debt is too high in recessions for it to ever
occur again.
The third prediction is that, in the long run, public spending and tax rates display a procyclical
pattern, with spending increasing in booms and decreasing in recessions, and tax rates decreasing
36in booms and increasing in recessions. The equilibrium changes in public spending and taxes
therefore serve to amplify the business cycle. This prediction serves to nicely diﬀerentiate our
theory both from a perfect foresight tax smoothing model and from what would be expected if
government were following a Keynesian counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy.
We hope that our theory will provide a new benchmark for empirical research on the cyclical
behavior of ﬁscal policy. When compared with the current benchmark theory - the perfect foresight
tax smoothing model - it both rests on more satisfactory assumptions and delivers a richer set
of predictions. The theory’s implications concerning the correlation of debt and government
spending with changes in GDP are consistent with evidence from the U.S. and the other G7
countries. In addition, the theory’s predictions concerning the dynamic evolution of the MCPF
ﬁnd some support in data from the U.S. and eight other countries. These, and the theory’s other
novel implications, warrant further empirical investigation.
The ultimate payoﬀ of having a more satisfactory theoretical account of the behavior of ﬁscal
policy is not only to improve our predictive ability, but also to be able to evaluate policy proposals
that seek to change ﬁscal and political constitutions. Policies of this form include balanced-budget
rules, debt limits, and super-majority budget approval requirements. The ﬁrm micro-foundations
of our theory make it particularly suitable for welfare analysis of such policies and this is also an
important topic for future research.41
41 See Azzimonti, Battaglini and Coate (2008) for a quantitative application of the Battaglini and Coate (2008)
model along these lines.
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3910 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The social planner’s solution arises as a special case of the political equilibrium when the legis-
lature operates by unanimity rule; that is, in which q = n.W ew i l lt h e r e f o r ed e l a yp r o o fo ft h i s
proposition until after we have understood the behavior of the political equilibrium.






τ=1 be an equilibrium with associated value functions vL(b)a n d









L satisfy (18). For then it would follow immediately from (14) that the value
functions vL(b)a n dvH(b) have the required properties.
We begin by making precise the claim made at the beginning of Section 5.2 that, given trans-
ferable utility, the proposer is eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the collective utility of q
legislators under the assumption that they get to divide any surplus revenues among their districts.
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s.t. Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
(29)








Proof: The proof of this result is similar to the proof of an analogous result in Battaglini and
Coate (2008) and thus is omitted. A proof is available from the authors upon request.
As we argued in the text, if the constraint Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0, is not binding, then the solution
to problem (29) is (r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ). On the other hand, if the constraint is binding, then the solution




s.t. Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
(30)
Letting b∗
θ be as deﬁned in (20), we conclude that {rθ(b), gθ(b), xθ(b)} =( r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ)w h e nb ≤ b∗
θ
and solves (30) when b>b ∗
θ. Thus, we need to show (i) that when b ≤ b∗
θ the solution to problem
(28) is (r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ), and, (ii) that when b>b ∗
θ the constraints r ≥ r∗, g ≤ g∗ and x ≥ x∗
θ will not
be binding in problem (28). For (ii), note ﬁrst that the solution to (30) when b = b∗
θ is (r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ)
and second that the optimal tax rate and debt level for problem (30) are non decreasing in b and
the public good is non increasing in b. For (i), note that when b ≤ b∗
θ the budget constraint cannot
be binding in problem (28) and, if the budget constraint is not binding, the individual constraints
r ≥ r∗, g ≤ g∗ and x ≥ x∗
θ must all bind. ¥
10.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let e vH and e vL be a pair of value functions and e xH and e xL a pair of debt levels such that (i)
e vH and e vL solve (19) given e xH and e xL, and, (ii) e xH and e xL solve (18) given e vH and e vL.L e t
(e rθ(b),e gθ(b), e xθ(b)) be the corresponding optimal policies that solve the program in (19). For each




θ(b)) = (e rθ(b),e gθ(b), e xθ(b));
for proposal rounds τ =1 ,...,T − 1
sτ
θ(b)=Bθ(e rθ(b),e gθ(b), e xθ(b);b)/n;















n + δ[αθHe vH(x)+αθLe vL(x)]





Given these proposals, the legislators’ round one value functions are given by e vH and e vL.T h i s
follows from the fact that
v1
θ(b)=uθ(e rθ(b),e gθ(b)) +
Bθ(e rθ(b),e gθ(b), e xθ(b);b)
n
+
41δ[αθHe vH(e xθ(b)) + αθLe vL(e xθ(b))] = e vθ(b).
Similarly, the round τ =2 ,...,T legislators’ value functions are given by e vH and e vL.














θ(b)) solves the problem
max
(r,g,x,s)
uθ(r,g)+Bθ(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δ[αθHe vH(x)+αθLe vL(x)]
s.t. uθ(r,g)+s + δ[αθHe vH(x)+αθLe vL(x)] ≥ Υ
τ+1
θ (b)
Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
where Υ
τ+1




θ (b). We show this result only for
τ =1 ,...,T − 1—t h ea r g u m e n tf o rτ = T being analogous.
Consider some proposal round τ =1 ,...,T − 1. Let (b,θ) be given. To simplify notation, let
(b r,b g,b x,b s)=( e rθ(b),e gθ(b),e xθ(b),
Bθ(e rθ(b),e gθ(b), e xθ(b);b)
n
).
Since e xθ solves (18), it follows from the discussion in Section 5.2 (and it can easily be formally






s.t. Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
and that
b s = e vθ(b) − uθ(b r,b g) − δ[αθHe vH(b x)+αθLe vL(b x)].
Suppose that (b r,b g,b x,b s)d o e sn o ts o l v et h er o u n dτ proposer’s problem. Then there exist some
(r0,g0,x 0,s 0) which achieves a higher value of the proposer’s objective function. We know that
s0 ≥ e vθ(b)−uθ(r0,g0)−δ[αθHe vH(x0)+αθLe vL(x0)]. Thus, we have that the value of the proposer’s
objective function satisﬁes
uθ(r0,g0)+Bθ(r0,g0,x 0;b) − (q − 1)s0 + δ[αθHe vH(x0)+αθLe vL(x0)]
≤ q{uθ(r0,g0)+δ[αθHe vH(x0)+αθLe vL(x0)]} + Bθ(r0,g0,x 0;b).
But since Bθ(r0,g0,x 0;b) ≥ 0, we know that
q{uθ(r0,g0)+δ[αθHe vH(x0)+αθLe vL(x0)]} + Bθ(r0,g0,x 0;b)
≤ q{uθ(b r,b g)+δ[αθHe vH(b x)+αθLe vL(b x)]} + Bθ(b r,b g,b x;b).
42But the right hand side of the inequality is the value of the proposer’s objective function under
the proposal (b r,b g,b x,b s). This therefore contradicts the assumption that (r0,g0,x 0,s 0)a c h i e v e sa
higher value for the proposer’s problem. ¥
10.4 Proof of Proposition 4
By Proposition 3, we can establish the existence of an equilibrium by showing that we can ﬁnd
a pair of value functions vH(b)a n dvL(b) and a pair of debt thresholds x∗
L and x∗
H such that (i)
vH(b)a n dvL(b) solve (19) given x∗
L and x∗
H, and, (ii) x∗
L and x∗
H solve (18) given vH(b)a n dvL(b).
We simply sketch how to do this here, the details are available on request.
Let F denote the set of all real valued functions v(·)d e ﬁned over the set [x,x]t h a ta r e
continuous and concave. For each θ ∈ {H,L} and any zθ ∈ [(RL(r∗) − pg∗)/ρ,x], deﬁne the
operator Tθ








n + δ [αθHvH(x)+αθLvL(x)]





Let z =( zH,z L)a n dl e tTz(vH,v L)(b)=( TH
zH(vH,v L)(b),TL
zL(vH,v L)(b)) be the corresponding
function from F × F to itself. For any z ∈ [(RL(r∗) − pg∗)/ρ,x]2,i tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that Tz is a
contraction and admits a unique ﬁxed point vz (where we use the subscript z to indicate that this




+ δ [αθHvHz(x)+αθLvLz(x)] : x ∈ [zθ,x]}
and let M(z)=MH(z) × ML(z). Then, we have an equilibrium if we can ﬁnd a ﬁxed point of
this correspondence, z ∈ M(z) .T h i sc a nb ep r o v e nb ys h o w i n gt h a tM satisﬁes the conditions of
Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. ¥
10.5 Proof of Lemma 1
From Proposition 2, we know that














43Moreover, from the discussion in the text, we know that if b ≤ b∗
θ the optimal policies are
(r∗,g∗,x ∗
θ), and, if b>b ∗
θ the constraints r ≥ r∗, g ≤ g∗ and x ≥ x∗
θ in the maximization
problem will not be binding, but the budget constraint will be binding.
Suppose ﬁrst that bo <b ∗















Now suppose that bo >b ∗
θ. Then, we know that in a neighborhood of bo it must be the case
that







n + δ [αθHvH(x)+αθLvL(x)]














+ δ [αθHvH(xθ(bo)) + αθLvL(xθ(bo))].
Notice that (rθ(bo),g(b),x θ(bo)) is a feasible policy when the initial debt level is b so that in







p )2 < 0
The second derivative property implies that η(b) is strictly concave. It follows from Theorem



















44which implies that αnAgθ(bo)α−1 = p[
1−rθ(bo)










10.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We proceed in two steps. First we prove that both in a political equilibrium and in the planner’s
solution, the upperbound on debt x ≤ x does not bind for any b<x. This establishes equation
(10) in Section 4 and equation (21) in Section 6. Then we prove the statement of Proposition 5
and equation (13) of Section 4.
Step 1. Consider a particular political equilibrium and let {rθ(b),g θ(b),x θ(b)} be the associated
equilibrium policies. We wish to prove that for any state (b,θ)t h e r ei sa n (b,θ) > 0 such that
xθ(b) < x− (b,θ). Since the planner’s solution arises as a special case of the political equilibrium
when q = n, this would imply that the same property holds for the planner’s solution. Assume
that there is a state (b,θ) such that xθ(b) is arbitrarily close to x;t h a ti s ,xθ(b)=x − η,w h e r eη
is arbitrarily small. We can write gθ(b)=φ(rθ(b)) where φ(r) is a continuous function implicitly
deﬁned by the solution of the equation nαAgα−1 =[ 1−r
1−r(1+ε)]p.S i n c exθ(b) >x ∗
θ,w em u s th a v e
Bθ(rθ(b),φ(rθ(b)),x θ(b);b)=0 . (31)
Thus, we can express all the policy choices as a function of η,w h e r exθ(b)=x−η = x(η), rθ(b)=
r(η) solves (31) and gθ(b)=φ(r(η)) = g(η). Note that as η → 0, we have r(η) → e r<1/(1+ε).
For if r(η) → 1/(1 + ε), then g(η) → 0 and (31) would not be satisﬁed since b<x.M o r e o v e r ,
r(η) → e r implies g(η) → e g>0.











1 − rL(x(η))(1 + ε)
¶
.
It is easy to see that rL(x(η)) → 1/(1+ε)a sη → 0. This implies that the right hand side of (32)
diverges to inﬁnity, while the left hand side converges to a ﬁnite value: a contradiction. ¥
Step 2. We now prove that the deadweight loss of taxation is a submartingale when q<n ,
with strict inequality for some states (b,θ). The argument in Section 6 establishes that the MCPF
45is a submartingale (equation (24)). To complete the statement of the proposition, note that if
q<n ,t h e nr∗ > 0, and b∗
θ >x . I ti sa l s oe a s yt os h o wt h a ti fq<n ,t h e r ei sab0 >x ∗
H
such that for any b ≤ b0 we have Pr(θ0 s.t. xθ(b) ≤ b∗
θ0 |θ) > 0 for any θ. For these states
(25) holds as a strict inequality. To prove (13), note that if q = n,t h e nr∗ =0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,
Pr(θ0 s.t. xθ(b) ≤ b∗
θ0 |θ) r∗ε
1−r∗(1+ε) = 0: which implies that both in an equilibrium with unanimity
and in the planner’s solution, the MCPF is a martingale. ¥
10.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Clearly for all states (b,θ)s u c ht h a tr∗
θ(b)=r∗,w eh a v er∗ <E(rθ0 (xθ(b))|θ). We now prove
that there are states in which rθ(b) >E(rθ0(xθ(b))|θ). We know from Lemma 2 and 3 below that
rH(xθ(b)) <r θ(b) for all states (b,θ)w i t hb ∈ [x,x] and that both limb→x rL(xL(b)) = 1/(1 + ε)
and limb→x rL(b)=1 /(1 + ε). So there is a η such that rH(xL(b)) <r L(b) − η for all b ∈ [x,x],
and there is a b0 such that rL(xL(b00)) <r L(b00)+
η
2 for b00 >b 0. This implies that for b>b 0 we
have










´¯ ¯ ¯e θ
´
<r h θ(e b).
While for states (e b, e θ)s u c ht h a te b ≤ b∗





´¯ ¯ ¯e θ
´
>r h θ(e b). So rθ (b)i sn o ta
m a r t i n g a l eo fa n yt y p e . ¥
10.8 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) We will establish that x∗
H ≥ x∗
L which will imply the result. Suppose that, to the contrary,
that x∗
H <x ∗
L. There are two possibilities. The ﬁrst is that b∗
L <b ∗
H. In this case, it follows from




H and that x∗
H and x∗




































In addition, αHL ≤ αLL and hence the above two ﬁrst order conditions are clearly inconsistent.
The second possibility is that b∗
L >b ∗





L.S i n c ex∗
H >b ∗
H,i tm u s tb et h a ti nab o o mw i t hd e b tl e v e lb = x∗
H the policy
is such that rH(x∗
H) >r ∗, gH(x∗
H) <g ∗,a n dxH(x∗
H) >x ∗








H)=RH(r∗) − pg∗ − ρx∗





L,i tm u s tb et h a ti nar e c e s s i o nw i t hd e b tl e v e lb = x∗






0 ≤ BL(r∗,g∗,x ∗
L;x∗
L)=RL(r∗) − pg∗ − ρx∗
L <R H(r∗) − pg∗ − ρx∗
L,
which is in contradiction with (33).
(ii) When b ≥ b∗
H, we know from the discussion following Proposition 2 that {rθ(b), gθ(b),
xθ(b)} satisﬁes the following three equations:
nαAgα−1 = p[
1 − r










Suppose, contrary to the claim in the Lemma, that rL(b) ≤ rH(b). Then it follows immediately






Suppose that it were the case that −v0
H(xH(b)) ≤− v0







47Combining these two inequalities we could conclude that xH(b) ≥ xL(b). But then we would have
0=BH(rH(b),g H(b),x H(b);b) >B L(rL(b),g L(b),x L(b);b)=0
a contradiction. Thus, we would have shown that rL(b) >r H(b).
It follows that we can prove the result by showing the following result:




Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 4, let F denote the set of all real valued functions v(·)
deﬁned over the set [x,x] that are continuous and concave. For θ ∈ {H,L},d e ﬁne the operator







n + δ [αθHvH(x)+αθLvL(x)]






Let T(vH,v L)(b)=( TH(vH,v L)(b),TL(vH,v L)(b)) be the corresponding function from F × F to
itself. From Proposition 2, we know that (vH,v L)=T (vH,v L). Moreover, T is a contraction.
Now let e vH and e vL belong to F and assume that for any b if ξL and ξH are sub-gradients
of e vL and e vH at b,t h e nw eh a v et h a t : −ξL ≥− ξH. Deﬁne v0 =( e vH,e vH) and consider the
sequence of functions hvθk (b)i
∞
k=1 for θ = H,L,d e ﬁned inductively as follows: vθ1 = Tθ(v0), and
vθk+1 = Tθ(vHk,v Lk). Let vk =( vHk,v Lk) and note that, since T is a contraction, hvki
∞
k=1 must
converge to (vH,v L).
Finally, for all μ>0, let
X
μ








θ(vk)b et h el a r g e s te l e m e n to ft h ec o m p a c ts e tX
μ
θ (vk). Notice that x
μ
θ(vk)i sn o n -







Claim: For all k, for any b ∈ [x,x] if ξk
L and ξk
H are sub-gradients of vLk and vHk at b then we
have that: −ξk
L ≥− ξk
H. In addition, if b ∈ (b∗
H(x
q
H(vk−1)),x],t h e nvHk and vLk are diﬀerentiable
at b and −v0
Lk(b) > −v0
Hk(b).
48Proof: The proof proceeds via induction. Consider the claim for k =1 .I ns t a t eθ if (r,g,x)i sa
solution to the problem
maxuθ(r,g)+
Bθ(r,g,x;b)
n + δ[αθHe vH(x)+αθLe vL(x)]
Bθ(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0, g ≤ g∗, r ≥ r∗ & x ∈ [x∗
θ,x]
,
then: (i) if b ≤ b∗
θ(xn
θ(v0)), (r,g)=( r∗,g∗)a n dx ∈ Xn










(r,g,x)i su n i q u e l yd e ﬁned and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover, r>r ∗ and g<g ∗.
Denote the solution in case (iii) as (rθ(b;v0),g θ(b;v0),x θ(b;v0)).








θ(v0)) + αθLe vL(xn
θ(v0))].














Tθ(v0)(b)=uθ(r∗,g∗)+δ[αθHe vH(pg∗ +( 1+ρ)b − Rθ(r∗)) + αθLe vL(pg∗ +( 1+ρ)b − Rθ(r∗))].
It follows that if μθ is a sub-gradient of Tθ(v0)a tb there exist sub-gradients ξH and ξL of e vH






θ(v0))] and hence if μθ is a sub-gradient of Tθ(v0)a tb


















n + δ[αθHe vH(x)+αθLe vL(x)]












n(1 − rθ(b;v0)(1 + ε))
(1 + ρ).








49Given the expressions for the derivatives and subgradients derived above, the result would
















L(v0))) if ξH and ξL are subgradients of e vH and e vL at pg∗+(1+ρ)b−RH(r∗)
and ξ0
H and ξ0
L are subgradients of e vH and e vL at pg∗ +( 1+ρ)b − RL(r∗), then
−δ[αHHξH + αHLξL](1 + ρ) ≤− δ[αLHξ0
H + αLLξ0
L](1 + ρ);





(1 − rL(b;v0)(1 + ε))
>
1 − rH(b;v0)
(1 − rH(b;v0)(1 + ε))
.
We will now establish that these four conditions are satisﬁed. For the ﬁrst, we will show that
xn
H(v0) ≥ xn
L(v0). Recall that by deﬁnition xn
θ(v0)i st h el a r g e s te l e m e n ti nt h ec o m p a c ts e t
Xn




+ δ[αθHe vH(x)+αθLe vL(x)] : x ∈ [x∗
θ,x]}.
As shown in part (i) of this Lemma, we have that x∗
H ≥ x∗
L. We can assume wlog that xn
L(v0) >x ∗
L.
Thus, there exists sub-gradients ξH and ξL of e vH and e vL at xn
L(v0)s u c ht h a t
1
n
= −δ [αLHξH + αLLξL].
Suppose that x ≤ xn
L(v0). Then, if ξ0
H and ξ0
L of e vH and e vL at x then since −ξH ≤− ξL,
αHH ≥ αLH,a n d−ξ0
θ ≤− ξθ, we know that:
−δ [αHHξ0
H + αHLξ0




This implies that xn
H(v0) ≥ xn
L(v0). A similar argument establishes the second condition.





L(v0))), let ξH and ξL be subgradients of
e vH and e vL at pg∗ +( 1+ρ)b − RH(r∗), and let ξ0
H and ξ0
L be subgradients of e vH and e vL at
pg∗ +( 1+ρ)b − RL(r∗). Then we have




where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the facts that αHH ≥ αLH and −ξH ≤− ξL,a n dt h es e c o n d
inequality follows from the facts that e vH and e vL are concave and that RH(r∗) >R L(r∗).




1 − rθ(b;v0)(1 + ε)
],
there exist subgradients ξH and ξL be subgradients of e vH and e vL at xθ(b;v0)s u c ht h a t
[
1 − rθ(b;v0)
1 − rθ(b;v0)(1 + ε)
]=−δn[αθHξH + αθLξL],
and
Bθ(rθ(b;v0),g θ(b;v0),x θ(b;v0);b)=0 .
Suppose to the contrary that rH(b;v0) ≥ rL(b;v0). Then, gH(b;v0) ≤ gL(b;v0)a n dxH(b;v0) ≥
xL(b;v0). It follows that
0=BH(rH(b;v0),g H(b;v0),x H(b;v0);b) ≥ BH(rL(b;v0),g L(b;v0),x L(b;v0);b)
>B L(rL(b;v0),g L(b;v0),x L(b;v0);b).
This is a contradiction.
Now assume that the claim is true for t =1 ,...k and consider it for k + 1. By the induction
step, for any b ∈ [x,x]i fξLk is a sub-gradient of vLk at b and ξHk is a sub-gradient of vHk at b
then we have that: −ξLk ≥− ξHk. It follows that vHk and vLk h a v et h es a m ep r o p e r t i e sa st h e
functions e vH and e vL and the same argument as above applies to step k +1 . ¥
We can now prove Lemma A.2. Given Lemma 1, all we need to do is to establish that if
b ∈ (b∗




Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists some b0 ∈ (b∗
H,x] such that −v0
L(b0) < −v0
H(b0).
Let ε>0 be such that b0 − ε>b ∗
H.G i v e n t h a t vk converges to (vH,v L), it must be the
case that x
q
H(vk)c o n v e r g e st ox
q
H (vH,v L)=x∗




H(vk)) <b 0 − ε. For any k suﬃciently large, therefore, the Claim implies that vHk and vLk
are diﬀerentiable on (b0 − ε,x]a n d−v0
Lk(b) > −v0
Hk(b) for any b ∈ (b0 − ε,x]. Thus, by Theorem
25.7 of Rockafellar (1970), we know that limk→∞ v0
θk(b)=v0
θ(b) for any b ∈ (b0 − ε,x], which
includes b0: a contradiction. ¥
5110.9 Proof of the results of Section 7.1
In Section 7.1 we claim that (i) if b ≥ b∗
H then rL(b) >r H(b), gL(b) <g H(b)a n dxL(b) >x H(b);
and (ii) there is a b b ∈ (b∗
L,b ∗
H) such that new debt will be higher in a recession than a boom if
and only if b>b b. We begin with part (i). We have already shown in Lemma 2 that when b ≥ b∗
H,




1 − r(1 + ε)
],
which implies that gL(b) <g H(b). In addition, since x∗
H ≤ b∗
H ≤ b, by Lemma 3 below we have
that
xH(b) ≤ b<x L(b).
Part (ii) follows from the facts that xL(b)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb on the interval (b∗
L,b ∗
H], xH(b)i s






H)( b yp a r t( i ) ) .
We also claim that tax revenues will be higher in a boom when b ≥ b b. To see this note ﬁrst
that
RH(rH(b)) ≥ pgH(b) − xH(b)+( 1+ρ)b
and that
RL(rL(b)) = pgL(b) − xL(b)+( 1+ρ)b.
Now note that gH(b) >g L(b) and, for b ≥ b b, xL(b) ≥ xH(b). ¥
10.10 Proof of Lemma 3
(i) If b ≤ b∗
L,w eh a v et h a txL(b)=x∗
L >b ∗
L ≥ b. Assume then that b>b ∗
L. Suppose, contrary to




1 − rL(b)(1 + ε)
.
Since xL(b) < x the ﬁrst order conditions for (rL(b),g L(b),x L(b)) imply that there must exist
sub-gradients ξL and ξH of vL and vH at xL(b)s u c ht h a t
1 − rL(b)
1 − rL(b)(1 + ε)
= −δn[αLHξH + αLLξL].
Since rL(b) >r ∗, for this equation to hold we must have that xL(b) >b ∗









52In addition, it must be the case that
−δξH < −δξL.
Clearly, this is case if xL(b) ≤ b∗
H.I f xL(b) >b ∗
H, the inequality follows from the fact that
rL(xL(b)) >r H(xL(b)). Thus, we have that
1 − rL(b)
1 − rL(b)(1 + ε)




1 − rL(xL(b))(1 + ε)
.
But this is a contradiction because the facts that rL(·) is increasing and that b ≥ xL(b), imply
that rL(b) ≥ rL(xL(b)).
(ii) If b ≤ b∗
H,w eh a v et h a txH(b)=x∗
H.T h u s , xH(b) >bif b<x ∗
H and xH(b) <bif
b ∈ (x∗
H,b ∗
H]. Assume then that b>b ∗
H. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that xH(b) ≥ b.B y




1 − rH(b)(1 + ε)
.
Since xH(b) ≥ b>b ∗
H >b ∗
L, then we know from the ﬁrst order condition for xH(b) and Lemma 1
that
1 − rH(b)
1 − rH(b)(1 + ε)
≥ αLH(
1 − rH(xH(b))
1 − rH(xH(b))(1 + ε)
)+αLL(
1 − rL(xH(b))
1 − rL(xH(b))(1 + ε)
)( = i fxH(b) < x),
Since rH(xH(b)) <r L(xH(b)), this equation implies that
1 − rH(b)
1 − rH(b)(1 + ε)
> (
1 − rH(xH(b))
1 − rH(xH(b))(1 + ε)
).
But this is a contradiction because the facts that rH(·)i si n c r e a s i n ga n db ≤ xH(b), imply that
rH(b) ≤ rH(xH(b)). ¥
10.11 Proof of Proposition 7
The dynamic pattern of debt described in the proposition follows immediately from Lemma 3.
Thus, to prove the proposition we must show that the debt distribution converges strongly to
a unique invariant distribution. To this end, deﬁne the state space S =[ x,x] ×{ L,H} with
associated σ-algebra F = B×H , where B is the family of Borel sets that are subsets of [x,x],
and H is the family of subsets of {L,H}. For any subset A ∈ F,l e tμt(A) denote the probability
53that the state lies in A in period t. The probability measure μt describes the debt distribution in
period t; for example, the probability that in period t the debt level lies between xa and xb in a
boom is given by μt(([xa,x b],H))/μt(([x,x],H)). We are thus interested in the long run behavior
of μt.
The probability distribution μ1 depends on the initial level of debt b0 and the initial state of
the economy. To describe the probability distribution in periods t ≥ 2w em u s tﬁrst describe the






{θ0: s.t.(xθ0(b),θ0)∈A} αθθ0 if ∃ θ0 s.t. (xθ0(b),θ0) ∈ A
0 otherwise
.
Intuitively, Q(A|b,θ) is the probability that a set A is reached in one step if the initial state is














We now show that the sequence of distributions hμti
∞
t=1 converges strongly to a unique invariant
distribution.
By Theorem 11.12 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), it is enough to show that the transition
function Q satisﬁes the M condition (see the deﬁnition in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989)). To







Thus, Qn(A|b,θ) is the probability that a set A is reached in n steps if the initial state is (b,θ). To
establish that Q satisﬁes the M condition, it is suﬃcient to prove that there exists a state (x∗,θ∗),
an integer N ≥ 1a n dan u m b e rε>0, such that for any initial state (b,θ), QN((x∗,θ ∗)|b,θ) >ε
(See Exercises 11.5 and 11.4 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989)).
Consider the state (x∗
H,H). Deﬁne η =m i n b∈[b∗
H,x] [b − xH(b)]. Since, by Lemma 3, xH(b) <b
for any b ∈ [b∗




we claim that for any initial state (b,θ), we have that:
QN((x∗
H,H)|b,θ) ≥ αLH (αHH)
N−1 > 0.





, we have the desired condition.
To see that the claim is true, suppose ﬁrst that the initial state (b,θ)i ss u c ht h a tb ≤ b∗
H.
With probability of at least αLH the state will be (x∗
H,θ H)i nt h en e x tp e r i o da n di tw i l lr e m a i n
there for as long as the economy remains in a boom (which happens with probability αHH). Next
suppose that the initial state (b,θ) is such that b>b ∗
H. With probability of at least αLH the
economy will be in a boom the next period and, again, it will remain in a boom thereafter with
probability αHH. If it does remain in a boom, then for as long as the debt level remains above
b∗
H, debt will be reduced by at least η in each period. Thus, after N periods, the debt level must
have gone below b∗
H in some period and therefore will have reached x∗
H. ¥
10.12 Proof of Proposition 10
The primary surplus in state θ is given by:
PSθ(b)=( 1+ρ)b − xθ(b).
Note ﬁrst that the primary surplus in state θ is increasing in b. This is immediate if b<b ∗
θ since
in that case xθ(b)=x∗
θ.T os e et h er e s u l ti fb>b ∗
θ note ﬁr s tt h a tw h e nt h em w ci sn o tp r o v i d i n g
pork
PSθ(b)=Rθ(rθ(b)) − pgθ(b).
Now recall that rθ(b)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb and gθ(b) is decreasing in b.
To understand the long run behavior of the primary surplus when the economy enters a boom,
let the level of debt when the economy enters a boom be b. By Proposition 5, we know that this
debt level must exceed x∗
H. To show that the primary surplus jumps up when the economy enters
the boom, we need to show that
(1 + ρ)b − xH(b) > (1 + ρ)x
−1
L (b) − b.
We have that, by deﬁnition,
(1 + ρ)x
−1
L (b) − b =( 1+ρ)x
−1
L (b) − xL(x
−1
L (b))
Since debt levels are increasing in a recession, we have that b>x
−1
L (b). Thus, using the fact that
PSL is increasing, we have that
(1 + ρ)x
−1
L (b) − xL(x
−1
L (b)) < (1 + ρ)b − xL(b).
55From the fact that b>x ∗
H, we know that xH(b) <x L(b) and hence
(1 + ρ)b − xL(b) < (1 + ρ)b − xH(b).
The fact that, after the initial jump, the primary surplus starts gradually declining until either
it reaches a minimal level of ρx∗
H or the boom ends follows from Proposition 5 and the fact that
PSH(b)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb.
To understand the long run behavior of the primary surplus when the economy enters a reces-
sion, let the level of debt when the economy enters a recession be b. By Proposition 5, we know
that this debt level must be at least as big as x∗
H. To show that the primary surplus jumps down
when the economy enters the boom, we need to show that
(1 + ρ)b − xL(b) < (1 + ρ)x
−1
H (b) − b.
We have that, by deﬁnition,
(1 + ρ)x
−1
H (b) − b =( 1+ρ)x
−1
H (b) − xH(x
−1
H (b)).
Since, in the long run, debt levels are decreasing or constant in a recession, we have that b ≤ x
−1
H (b).
Thus, using the fact that PS H is increasing, we have that
(1 + ρ)x
−1
H (b) − xH(x
−1
H (b)) ≥ (1 + ρ)b − xH(b).
From the fact that b>x ∗
H, we know that xH(b) <x L(b) and hence that
(1 + ρ)b − xH(b) > (1 + ρ)b − xL(b).
The fact that, after the initial jump, the primary surplus starts increasing follows from Proposition
5 and the fact that PS L(b)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb. ¥
10.13 Completion of proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrst task is to solve for r∗, g∗, x∗
L and x∗
H when q = n. From (16) and (17), we see that
r∗ equals 0 and g∗ equals the Samuelson level gS.F o rx∗
L and x∗
H,n o t eﬁrst that the value function
vθ is diﬀerentiable everywhere since at x = b∗
θ the left hand derivative is equal to the right hand
derivative. We can therefore use ﬁrst order conditions to characterize x∗
L and x∗
H.W h e nq = n,
the ﬁrst order condition for x∗














θ must be less than or equal to b∗
L.S i n c e r∗ =0a n dg∗ = gS,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
ρx∗
θ ≤− pgS. It follows that x∗
L = x∗
H = x. This, in turn, implies that b∗
L = b∗
H = x.
It remains to understand the dynamics of the planner’s solution. Note ﬁr s tt h a ts i n c eb∗
L =
b∗
H = x and x∗
L = x∗
H = x, if the debt level ever got to x, it would remain there forever. Lemma 3
therefore needs to be modiﬁed to say (i) that for all b ∈ (x,x), xL(b) >band (ii) for all b ∈ (x,x],
xH(b) <b . Thus, if the debt level exceeds x, debt increases in recessions and decreases in booms.
In the long run, however, the debt level must reach x with probability one and at that point the
cyclical ﬂuctuation in debt stops. A steady state is reached in which the debt level is x,t h et a x
rate is 0, and the public good level is gS. This is precisely the claim made in Proposition 1. ¥
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